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CLASS CONFLICT IN SECURITIES FRAUD 
LITIGATION 
Richard A. Booth* 
ABSTRACT 
Although securities fraud class actions are a well-established legal 
institution, few (if any) such actions in fact meet the requirements of Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for certification as a class 
action.  Among other things, Rule 23 requires the court to find that the 
representative plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class and that a class action is superior to other means of resolving the 
dispute. 
In a typical securities fraud case, the plaintiff class consists of 
investors who buy the subject stock at a time when the defendant 
corporation has negative material information that should be publicly 
disclosed.  When the truth comes out, stock price declines, and those who 
bought during the fraud period sue the corporation for damages equal to the 
difference between the price they paid and the price at which the stock 
finally settles.  Only buyers have standing to sue in such circumstances. 
Mere holders have no claim. 
The problem is that most buyers are also holders.  Most investors are 
well diversified.  More than two-thirds of all stock is held through mutual 
funds, pension plans, and other institutional investors, who trade mostly for 
purposes of portfolio balancing.  As a result, most of the buyers in the 
plaintiff class will also be holders as to more shares than the number of 
shares bought during the fraud period.  Because the defendant corporation 
pays any settlement—further reducing the value of the corporation and its 
stock price through feedback—most of the plaintiff class will lose more as 
holders than they gain as buyers.  Thus, many members of the plaintiff 
class would prefer that the action be dismissed.  It is therefore impossible 
for anyone to be an adequate representative of a class composed of both 
members who support the action and members who oppose the action.  
Even if a court would permit a plaintiff class to be gerrymandered to 
include only those buyers who would gain more than they lose, there is no 
practical way to identify such investors. 
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In addition, it is likely that in most meritorious securities fraud 
actions, part of the decrease in stock price will come from expenses 
associated with defending and settling the securities fraud claim and from 
harm to the reputation of the defendant company resulting in an increase in 
its cost of capital.  But these claims are properly viewed as derivative rather 
than direct.  Accordingly, it is the corporation—and not individual 
buyers—who should recover for this portion of the damages.  Aside from 
the fact that such claims are derivative in nature and presumably must be 
litigated as such, a derivative action is clearly superior to a class action 
because recovery by the corporation from individual wrongdoers—rather 
than payment by the corporation to buyers—eliminates feedback damages 
and thus reduces the size of the aggregate claim.  Moreover, a derivative 
action is more efficient in that there is a single plaintiff—the corporation—
rather than hundreds or thousands of individual buyers. 
Finally, policy considerations also militate against certification.  
Diversified investors are hedged against securities fraud by virtue of being 
diversified and have no need for a remedy.  A diversified investor is just as 
likely to sell a fraud-affected stock as to buy one.  It all comes out in the 
wash.  Thus, the expenses associated with securities fraud class actions are 
a deadweight loss that serve only to reduce investor return.  Because the 
vast majority of investors are diversified—and because it is irrational for 
most investors not to diversify—the interests of diversified investors should 
trump those of any undiversified investors who would favor a class action 
remedy.  Moreover, class actions constitute excessive deterrence, whereas 
derivative actions provide a response that is proportional to the true harm 
suffered by investors.  Diversified investors are completely protected 
against any true loss by the prospect of derivative litigation, which also 
provides an effective deterrent against securities fraud. 
In short, when faced with a motion to certify a securities fraud action 
as a class action, a court should ordinarily treat the action as derivative and 
proceed accordingly.  To be clear, this approach would effectively abolish 
securities fraud class actions and replace them with derivative actions.  But 
as demonstrated here, investors would be better off as a result. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A securities fraud class action under Rule 10b-5 usually arises from 
the failure of a publicly traded company to disclose material information in 
a timely fashion.
1
  The information may be either good news or bad news.  
 
         * Martin G. McGuinn Professor of Business Law, Villanova University School of 
Law. 
 1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).  The focus here is on securities fraud class actions 
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder) 
in connection with trading in outstanding shares.  Although class actions also arise in 
connection with initial public offerings (IPOs)—as well as subsequent offerings by publicly 
traded companies—such claims under the 1933 Act are fundamentally different because 
they involve the offer and sale of stock by the defendant company.  In contrast, claims 
arising under Rule 10b-5 are based on the purchase or sale of outstanding shares in trading 
that does not involve the company itself at a time when the market price is allegedly 
affected by the nondisclosure (cover-up) of material information.  Over the last fifteen years 
(since 1996), more than 2800 securities fraud class actions have been filed against publicly 
traded companies in the United States. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
FILINGS: 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW 3 (2011). These actions have resulted in settlements of about 
$64 billion.  See ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2010 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
2010 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS], (listing yearly settlement totals from 2001 through 2010); 
LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM ACT 
SECURITIES SETTLEMENTS: 2005 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 REVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS] (listing yearly settlement totals from 1997 through 2005).  Selected data 
from these Cornerstone reports is collected in the appendix hereto.   
  Most securities fraud class actions arise under Rule 10b-5.  During the period 2006 
to 2010, the proportion of securities fraud class actions including Rule 10b-5 claims ranged 
from a high of 87% (in 2006) to a low of 66% (in 2010) though the trend was distinctly 
downward.  CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2010 YEAR IN 
REVIEW at 32.  The significance of the distinction between Rule 10b-5 claims and 1933 Act 
claims is discussed further below.  The standard practice is to pay plaintiff attorney fees and 
other expenses out of the award.  On average, a rough but conservative estimate is that about 
20% of a settlement goes to plaintiff attorney fees and expenses.  See ANJAN V. THAKOR, 
NAVIGANT CONSULTING, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 
Exhibit A-1 (2005) (finding plaintiff attorney fees of $3.1 billion in connection with 
settlements totaling $19.8 billion in a sample of 482 class actions or about 16% of the 
settlement amounts); Denise M. Martin, et al., Recent Trends IV: What Explains Filings and 
Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 141 (1999) (finding 
average fees of 32%); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Attorney’s Fees and 
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008 (NYU School of Law, Law and 
Economics Working Paper 09-50) (Nov. 2009) (finding average fees of 23%).  Thus, it 
would appear that plaintiff attorney fees and expenses have totaled about $13 billion since 
1996.  Assuming that defendant law firms have been paid roughly the same amount, it 
seems a fair estimate that securities fraud class actions have generated about $26 billion in 
attorney fees over the last ten years.  To be sure, defendant firms are paid in all cases, 
whether or not the plaintiff prevails, but presumably defendant firm fees are a good deal less 
than plaintiff firm fees in cases in which plaintiffs prevail.  Plaintiffs succeed to some extent 
in about 40% of cases.  See Appendix (collecting Cornerstone data).  Awards are usually 
paid by defendant company’s insurance.  See Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, Predicting 
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In other words, an action may be triggered by news that causes the price of 
a stock to rise—in which case those who sold during the fraud period suffer 
harm—or by news that causes the price of a stock to fall—in which case 
those who bought during the fraud period suffer harm.  There are notable 




But actions based on bad news are far 
more common.
3
  Thus, the discussion here generally assumes that the fraud 
involves a failure to disclose bad news. 
In a bad news case, the plaintiff class consists of all who purchased 
the stock in question during the fraud period and continue to hold it until 
corrective disclosure.
4
  The standard approach to damages in a bad news 
 
Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance 
Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 488 (2007) (explaining that shareholder litigation, including 
class actions, usually settle within the limits of the corporations’ insurance coverage). 
 2. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 
(2008) (bad news); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (bad news); Basic, 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (good news);  In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 
F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993) (bad news); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (good news).  There are, of course, many other forms of securities 
fraud, ranging from those arising in face-to-face dealings to those arising in connection with 
corporate level mismanagement, but these other actions are seldom amenable to pursuit as 
class actions.  In other words, securities fraud class actions almost invariably arise because 
of an issuer’s failure to disclose material information to the market in a timely fashion. 
 3. Actions based on bad news are more common because of the way damages are 
awarded in securities fraud class actions.  Because the company pays, the stock price falls 
further thus enhancing damages through positive feedback and making the securities fraud 
class action that much more lucrative for the plaintiff lawyers.  In a good news case, the 
securities fraud class action has the effect of muting the price increase through negative 
feedback and reducing the potential award.  For example, data indicate that of the 119 
securities fraud class actions filed in 2006, only two involved good news.  Author Analysis 
of Stanford University Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) 2006 data (on file 
with author). 
 4. The fraud period is the period between an actionable misrepresentation or omission 
and corrective disclosure.  Some may quibble with this characterization in that it can be 
unclear exactly when the truth comes out.  See Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 
938 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an inflated purchase price was enough to show loss 
causation, even though the price did not fall with corrective disclosure), rev’d, 544 U.S. 336, 
338 (2005) (holding that loss causation is proved by evidence that investors suffered a loss  
caused by purchasing a stock that was overpriced as a result of false statements or 
omissions).  See also Jay W. Eisenhofer, Geoffrey C. Jarvis & James R. Banko, Securities 
Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based 
Theory of Loss Causation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1419, 1419–21 (2004) (arguing that a stock price 
decline corresponding with disclosure should not be necessary to sustain a fraud claim).  
Nevertheless, no one seems to deny that the price of the stock must decline for some reason 
after the plaintiff purchases, and most would likely agree that the decline must somehow be 
tied to the original failure to disclose.  See Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 343 (2005) 
(holding that the inflated purchase price itself does not constitute a claim); Emergent Capital 
Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2003) (plaintiffs 
must allege price correction to plead loss causation).  Thus, for convenience, I will assume 
here that a prototypical securities fraud class action involves a prolonged failure of 
disclosure followed by a corrective disclosure by which the whole truth comes out all at 
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case is to award the difference between the price paid by the buyer and the 
market price after corrective disclosure.
5
  And it is the company (or its 
insurer) that pays the award.
6
  But the investor who innocently sells an 
overpriced stock need not disgorge her (effective) gain. 
Although one might think that investors are protected by securities 
fraud class actions and thus would favor them as a legal institution, one 
would be wrong.  Most investors are diversified.  From the viewpoint of 
diversified investors—the great majority of investors—class actions confer 
 
once and with no interim leakage.  I should note that I do not distinguish here between 
misrepresentations and omissions.  Both are generally actionable, although there are subtle 
differences in the relevant law. Compare Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 
406 U.S. 128 (1972) (finding a 10b-5 violation where bank employees induced owners of a 
development corporation to sell their stock while omitting facts which would have been 
likely to influence their decisions whether to sell), with Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 249 (finding 
a 10b-5 violation where the company misrepresented to the public that it was not involved 
in merger talks, when in fact merger talks were ongoing).  In practice, most securities fraud 
class actions arise from some combination of the two.  For example, a company might issue 
a press release or periodic report that is correct at the time of release.  The press release then 
becomes false or misleading as a result of intervening events, but the company then fails to 
issue another release to correct the lingering false impression.  See In re Time Warner Sec. 
Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 270 (N.Y. 1993) (statements accurate when made, but later require 
correction so as not to mislead the market). 
 5. This description of how damages are calculated is a bit oversimplified, but it is 
good enough for present purposes.  Although there has been no case in which a jury has 
actually done so, the courts generally have agreed that the jury should determine the correct 
market price of the subject stock on each day during the fraud period, in effect creating a 
price line that would be compared to the daily market price to determine the damages for 
investors who bought on any given day.  This approach to calculating damages can be traced 
back to Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976), and it is the 
formulation upon which Congress relied in connection with the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA). See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (In calculating 
damages, provides for the taking into account of the date which a plaintiff purchased the 
security).  Although this is a common description of the measure of damages, and may well 
be applied in some cases, it is a gross oversimplification.  For example, factors other than 
fraud may have affected market price before corrective disclosure. Or the truth may dribble 
out.  See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1490–92 (1996) (describing the difficulty in calculating the effect of 
withheld information on the market price); Richard A. Booth, Windfall Awards Under 
PSLRA, 59 BUS. LAW. 1043, 1047–54 (2004) (discussing effect of truth leaking out); 
Michael Y. Scudder, Comment, The Implications of Market-Based Damages Caps in 
Securities Class Actions, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 435, 462 (1997) (explaining how extraneous 
events can also affect the market price).  Of course, most securities fraud class actions are 
settled if they are not dismissed.  Thus, it is unusual for damages ever to be awarded by a 
court.  Nevertheless, the putative measure of damages will affect settlement negotiations.  
Moreover, given that the settlement of a class action must be approved by the court, the 
court itself may well consider the parties’ assumptions and estimates as to damages.  
Accordingly, I use the more neutral word award to refer herein to both damages and 
settlements. 
 6. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 1, at 533 (describing the insurers’ substantial role 
in shareholder litigation). 
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no genuine benefit because a diversified investor is equally likely to sell an 
overpriced stock (and gain) as to buy one (and lose).  So gains and losses 
wash out.  In other words, a diversified investor is effectively insured 
against securities fraud.  For a diversified investor, the cost of class 
actions—in attorney fees and other expenses—constitutes a deadweight 
loss, like buying a second insurance policy when one can recover only 
once.  At best, recovery via class action is an expensive rearrangement of 
wealth from one pocket to another—minus a cut for the lawyers. 
Diversified investors lose even more from securities fraud class 
actions in cases in which they are mere holders of the subject stock.  Only 
buyers have standing to sue for their losses under Rule 10b-5.
7
  But the 
prospect of payout by the defendant company causes its stock price to fall 
more than it otherwise would.  Moreover, it triggers a positive feedback 
mechanism that has the effect of magnifying the potential payout.  In other 
words, the prospect of payout to the plaintiff class causes the price of the 
subject stock to fall by an amount in addition to the decrease attributable to 
the disclosure of new negative information.  That in turn increases the 
potential damages payable by the subject company causing a further 
decrease in price.  And so on.
8
  The bottom line is that class actions reduce 
 
 7. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) 
(holding that federal securities law preempts state law which may allow a cause of action for 
mere holders of the security); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 
(1975) (holding that the 10b-5 remedy is limited to buyers). 
 8. The extent of feedback ultimately depends on the number of shares represented by 
the plaintiff class.  For example, if the holdings of the plaintiff class are equal to 50% of the 
outstanding shares, the decrease in the price of the subject stock will be twice what it would 
have been in the absence of a class action.  The appendix sets forth the formula for 
calculating the feedback effect in both bad news and good news cases together with charts 
showing the results for various class sizes.  See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities 
Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 1, 3–5 (2007) (describing the 
effects of the feedback mechanism).  One of the supposed problems that led to the 
enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) was the fact 
that stock price seems to fall by more than it should when a company makes a corrective 
disclosure.  Most observers attributed this to market overreaction to bad news.  Fear trumps 
greed.  Accordingly, PSLRA provides that rather than calculating damages by reference to 
market price immediately following corrective disclosure, damages shall be calculated by 
reference to the average closing price for 90 days following corrective disclosure.  For a 
summary of thinking about crash damages as well as the problems with the PSLRA 
approach, see Booth, supra note 5, at 1045–46.  The PSLRA approach seems to have been 
based on the assumption that market price usually springs back after the initial shock of 
corrective disclosure.  But if the additional decline comes from feedback as described here, 
there is no reason to expect the market to rebound unless new information comes out that 
suggests that the claim is likely to be dismissed or that the claim is otherwise smaller than 
originally thought.  That may be a good enough reason to provide for a cooling off period.  
Nevertheless, if the excess loss comes from feedback there is no reason to think that it 
would not be permanent, all other things being equal).  Incidentally, if the overreaction 
theory is correct, one would expect traders to flock to fraud-affected stocks precisely 
because they are systematically underpriced. 
BOOTH_FINALIZEDTHREE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012  11:24 AM 
2012] CLASS CONFLICT IN SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION 707 
 
aggregate investment returns.  The cure is worse than the disease.  
Securities fraud class actions serve only to reduce aggregate returns for 




In contrast, securities fraud class actions may make sense from the 
viewpoint of an undiversified investor.  An undiversified investor may 
suffer real harm from securities fraud.  For example, an investor who 
forgoes the benefits of diversification and picks a single stock can lose 
everything.  To be sure, such an investor may gain if she happens to sell an 
overpriced stock.  Moreover, such an investor may also lose as a mere 
holder if the subject stock becomes the target of a securities fraud class 
action because of events that occur after she buys.  Nevertheless, for an 
undiversified investor, the benefits of securities fraud class actions may 
outweigh the costs.  Just as one may gain peace of mind from buying 
insurance—even though one pays but never collects—an undiversified 
investor may find it a good deal to be (somewhat) protected against 




 9. It is ironic that the Supreme Court begins its recent Tellabs opinion with Justice 
Ginsburg’s statement that the Court “has long recognized that meritorious private actions to 
enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecution 
and civil enforcement actions . . . .”  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 
308, 313 (2007).  While the Court follows this statement with the qualification that it also 
recognizes that the system can be abused to impose unjustified costs on innocent companies 
and individuals, the tea leaves seem to indicate that the justices are not inclined to scrap the 
system.  Interestingly, it appears that mutual funds and other institutional investors often 
forgo the opportunity to file claims in successful securities fraud class actions.  See James 
D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail 
to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 879 (2002) (suggesting 
that institutions are often not filing claims in securities class action lawsuits).  Although one 
might be tempted to argue that this constitutes some kind of evidence that institutional 
investors have recognized that securities fraud class actions are counterproductive, the fact 
is that failure to file a claim when others file is irrational (irrespective of whether one favors 
securities fraud class actions) and amounts to a subsidy running from funds to claimants.  
On the other hand, it may be that mutual fund investments tend to be concentrated in 
particular stocks and that failure to file a claim is more common in cases in which most 
other investors are also mutual funds, suggesting a form of consciously parallel behavior.  
See A.C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 883–88 (2002) (replying to Cox 
and Thomas).  In any event, there has been a flurry of lawsuits recently against mutual funds 
that failed to file claims in securities fraud class actions.  See Jonathan D. Glater, Suits 
Contend Mutual Funds Fail to Collect in Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at C1. 
(reporting on these lawsuits against institutional investors). 
 10. An investor is somewhat protected because securities fraud class actions are usually 
settled and the amount recovered is seldom if ever equal to the full amount of the loss 
suffered by buyers.  Moreover, the settlement is further reduced by litigation expenses—
primarily attorney fees—which average about 20% of the award.  And that does not include 
the cost to the defendant company, which further reduces the value of the fraud-affected 
stock.  Thus, it is not completely clear that even an undiversified investor would favor the 
existing system if she understood that it causes stock price to fall more than it otherwise 
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Thus, there is a fundamental conflict between the interests of 
diversified investors and the interests of undiversified investors.
11
  
Diversified investors should be opposed to securities fraud class actions 
while undiversified investors may well favor such actions.  Accordingly, 
the courts should decline to certify a securities fraud action as a class action 
because the conflicting interests of diversified and undiversified investors 
make it impossible for a class action to be prosecuted consistent with the 
interests of both groups of investors.  Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires that the court determine that the representative 
plaintiff(s) will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
12
  
That is impossible where the interests of class members are diametrically 
opposed—where one group would favor prosecution of the action and the 
other group would favor dismissal of the action.  It does no good here for 
the courts to form subclasses or to rely on the right of investors to opt out 
of the class action.  If the subclass of undiversified investors wins, the 
subclass of diversified investors loses.  Yet if the action proceeds as a class 
action, diversified investors cannot afford to opt out because the company 
pays.  By forgoing compensation, diversified investors effectively pay 
those who remain in the action just as if they declined to accept their share 
of a dividend paid by the company. 
In addition to feedback loss, holders suffer a further loss because of 
the expenses suffered by the corporation in defending itself against the 
class action and any other enforcement proceedings (not to mention 
possible fines and the intangible costs of management distraction).
13
  
Moreover, the corporation may suffer reputational harm that increases its 
cost of capital and further drives down stock price.
14
  Although buyers may 
 
would.  From an ex ante perspective such an investor is more likely to be a holder than to be 
a buyer and is thus more likely to lose because of feedback than to gain from being a 
member of the plaintiff class.  Finally, if the plaintiff class is so large that success of the 
action threatens to bankrupt the defendant company and drive the stock price to zero, all 
investors may be better off if the action is dismissed and the company survives.  For 
example, in the collapse of Enron, the market capitalization fell from $70 billion to zero 
even though Enron was probably worth about $30 billion as a going business.  Michael C. 
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What 
Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 46 (European Corporate Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 44, 2004).  In some cases the effect on the defendant business can be 
devastating.  Indeed, about 30% of target companies end up bankrupt.  2005 REVIEW AND 
ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 14. 
 11. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 1506 (explaining the phenomenon in which the 
costs of the settlement are ultimately borne by the shareholders, particularly institutional 
investors who often only have interest in an action for its deterrence value). 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 13. See Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 14. Barbara Black, Reputational Damages in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 169, 
174–75 (2009). But see Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for 
Rule 10b-5 Causes-of-Action: The Implication of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo 19–24 
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recover for these losses because they are built into the total decline in stock 
price, they are losses suffered by all of the stockholders and not merely 
those who bought during the fraud period.  In such cases, diversified 
investors would not want the company to decrease its value still further by 
compensating buyers.  Rather, diversified investors would prefer to have 
the company recover from the individual wrongdoers to restore company 
value.  Finally, if insiders extract gains during the fraud period, either by 
means of insider trading or other forms of misappropriation, the company 




As a matter of prevailing practice, derivative claims are almost always 
addressed after class claims are resolved, even though recovery by the 
corporation would have the effect of reducing the aggregate damages 
suffered by the class.  This is doubly troubling because class claims 
typically deplete the funds available from insurance.  Thus, derivative 
claims are typically settled by the corporation adopting governance reforms 
of dubious value but without any monetary recovery by the corporation.  In 
short, the class claims of buyers—who need no remedy because they can 
diversify—are favored over the very real claims of the corporation, whose 
recovery would redound to the benefit of all stockholders—buyers 
included. 
This article proceeds as follows:  
First, I discuss the characteristics of the investor population—at least 
two-thirds of which is very well diversified by virtue of investment through 
various institutional vehicles.  I then discuss the reasons why diversified 
investors trade the stocks in their portfolios, and the attendant odds of 
investing in a stock that is the target of a securities fraud class action.  
Finally, I show why, with the exception of cases in which insiders have 
caused reputational harm to the issuer or have misappropriated stockholder 
wealth, diversified investors have nothing to gain from securities fraud 
class actions. Otherwise, securities fraud is a zero-sum game. 
Second, I consider in more detail the elements of damages that may 
compose securities fraud class action awards and the character of each as 
either a direct claim or a derivative claim.  I argue that there are four 
possible elements of damages:  (1) the decrease in price from the disclosure 
of bad news (fundamental loss), (2) the decrease in price from the prospect 
of payout by the defendant company (feedback loss), (3) the decrease in 
 
(Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 
08/2007, 2007) (discussing the financial implications of corrective disclosure); Baruch Lev 
& Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and 
Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 10–11 (1994) (arguing that there should be no recovery 
for consequential damages in connection with securities fraud claims) 
 15. Pfeiffer, 989 A.2d at 691–95. 
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price from the direct expenses suffered by the defendant company 
(including attorney fees and expenses, and fines imposed by regulators) 
(litigation loss), and (4) the decrease in price from the perception that the 
subject company is riskier than previously thought and the increased cost of 
capital that goes with it (cost of capital loss). 
This last element of damages may or may not be actionable.  Cost of 
capital loss may come from the fact that the market has discovered new 
information about the company that indicates that the company is riskier 
than previously thought.  Or it may come from a loss in trust resulting from 
management malfeasance.  The decrease in price from management 
malfeasance—which is likely to be present in any meritorious case because 
of the scienter requirement under Rule 10b-5—is clearly derivative in 
nature.  As such, it is a claim that belongs to all of the stockholders, not 
simply those who bought during the fraud period. 
Third, I discuss the requirements of Rule 23 and show why securities 
fraud actions that seek damages on behalf of individual investors cannot 
meet these requirements.  First, given the conflicting interests of diversified 
and undiversified investors, no one individual can be an adequate 
representative for both groups.  Many if not most diversified investors lose 
more from a class action than they gain and would thus prefer that the 
action be dismissed.  Second, a derivative action is superior to a class 
action for purposes of resolving the claims that are common to diversified 
and undiversified investors.  Indeed, if a claim is derivative, it should be 
governed by Rule 23.1, and the question of class certification should not 
arise in the first place.  Third, there are individual questions of reliance that 
must be addressed by undiversified investors.  Although reliance may be 
presumed under the fraud on the market doctrine, this presumption extends 
only to diversified investors who are passive price-takers.  By definition, an 
undiversified investor is a stock-picker who presumably has specific 
reasons for picking the stocks that he does.  Thus, the very fact that such an 
investor is undiversified rebuts the presumption of reliance on market 
prices.  Finally, it is up the court to manage the litigation.  At the very least, 
it is up to the court to decide the order in which claims will be resolved.  It 
is clear that claims that affect all of the stockholders should take 
precedence over claims affecting only undiversified investors. 
Fourth, I address a variety of policy considerations that bolster the 
case against securities fraud class actions and the case for derivative 
actions.  Specifically, I address the deterrence and compensation functions 
of securities fraud litigation and show that derivative actions provide a 
more proportional remedy on both counts.  Moreover, I show that the law 
should presume that a reasonable investor is a diversified investor and that 
in any situation in which the interests of diversified investors diverge from 
those of undiversified investors (as they do in securities fraud litigation), 
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the interests of diversified investors should trump those of undiversified 
investors. 
I. THE MATHEMATICS OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS 
To understand investor preferences regarding securities fraud 
litigation, it is important to have some sense of the odds that an investor 
will be a buyer, a seller, or a holder of a target stock.  That requires some 
sense of investor demographics. 
A.  The Investor Population 
About two-thirds of all stock is held by very well diversified 
institutions such as mutual funds and retirement plans.
16
  This is not 
 
 16. According to Federal Reserve Board data, as of year-end 2006 there was an 
outstanding $20.603 trillion in (publicly traded) equity of United States companies of which 
$5.483 trillion was held by households and nonprofit institutions.  L.213 Corporate Equities, 
in FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS FOURTH 
QUARTER 2006 90.  (Note that these figures do not include investment company shares.)  
Historically, nonprofits have accounted for about 9% of the equity holdings of the 
household sector.  See L.100.a Nonprofit Organizations, supra at 109 (showing annual data 
for 1988 through 2000). This sector apparently also includes stock held by other 
corporations, but assuming that individual holdings equal 91% of the household sector 
(about $4.990 trillion), institutions and not individuals own about 76% (roughly $15.135 
trillion) of all equities outstanding.  Because institutions are fiduciaries, they are generally 
required to diversify under general principles of trust law or more specific statutes such as 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Employee Retirement and Income Security 
Act (ERISA).  See, e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (2011) 
(stating investment company may not be classified as diversified if it has more than 5% of 
its assets invested in any one issuer).  Thus, it seems fair to presume that institutions are 
diversified.  Federal Reserve Board data also indicated that 9.5% of families held fifteen or 
more stocks.  Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in 
U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, 92 
FED. RES. BULL., A1, A15 (Feb. 2006). That is a shockingly low number. See also William 
N. Goetzmann & Alok Kumar, Equity Portfolio Diversification 23–24 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 8686, 2001) (showing that individual investors are largely 
under-diversified).  Nevertheless, if such investors are counted as diversified, total holdings 
of diversified investors are about $15.609 trillion.  Moreover, individuals ultimately hold the 
interests in the institutions that hold diversified portfolios. Studies indicate that an investor 
can achieve adequate diversification with as few as twenty different stocks.  See Franco 
Modigliani & Gerald A. Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return, 30 FIN. ANAL. J. 68, 
74–75 (1974) (finding that a portfolio of twenty stocks can essentially eliminate company 
specific risk and will perform almost identically to the broader market); see also James M. 
Park & Jeremy C. Staum, Diversification: How Much is Enough? (Nat’l Bureau Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 85428, 1998) (suggesting that while twenty is preferable, 
adequate diversification may be achieved with as few as five funds).  It is not necessary for 
present purposes to know how much diversification is enough.  It is sufficient to note that it 
is essentially costless for an investor to diversify and that the risk of securities fraud, like 
other types of company-specific risk, can be eliminated through diversification.  Most 
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surprising.  One would expect most individual investors to invest through 
institutions, because that is the cheapest and easiest way to achieve 
diversification.  Indeed, it is irrational for most investors not to be 
diversified.  An undiversified investor assumes unnecessary risk for the 
same expected return that diversified investors enjoy.  Moreover, since 
diversified investors assume less risk, they are willing to pay more for 
stocks.  Accordingly, diversified investors drive up market prices.  As a 
result, undiversified investors overpay because they pay market prices that 
are effectively set by diversified investors who perceive less risk.  In any 
event, it is quite clear that most stock is held by diversified investors. 
Diversification has implications for trading.  There is little reason for a 
diversified investor to engage in much stock-picking.  The point of 
diversification is to avoid the risk that goes with investing in individual 
stocks.  Moreover, the cost of trading—including research and 
commissions—eats into investment returns.  Further, it is impossible to 
beat the market without inside information.
17
  So, there is little reason to 
believe that diversified investors do much discretionary trading. 
On the other hand, an investor can engage in some stock picking with 
very little risk as long as he stays diversified.  It is common for individual 
investors to sell winners and losers in tandem in order to minimize taxes.  
To the extent that trading is so motivated, tax law dictates that if one sells a 
stock to recognize the loss, the funds cannot be reinvested in the same 
stock.  Otherwise the transaction is ignored for tax purposes.  This suggests 
that when diversified investors do trade, they often sell all of the stocks 
they choose to sell and replace them with new stocks.  Since capital gains 
and the attendant tax benefits pass through to mutual fund investors, it 
seems fair to assume that mutual funds trade for these reasons as well. 
Although stock picking and tax planning undoubtedly motivate some 
trading by diversified investors, another important reason for a diversified 
investor to trade is to maintain portfolio balance.  Over time, some stocks 
will increase in value while others will decrease in value.  To remain well 
diversified, an investor must periodically rebalance her portfolio by selling 
stocks that are overrepresented in the portfolio and by buying stocks that 




individual investors diversify by investing in mutual funds and similar pooled investment 
vehicles.  Thus, even a very small investor may invest in a fully diversified portfolio of 200 
to 300 different stocks.  While funds do charge a variety of fees in addition to the direct 
expenses of holding and trading portfolio securities, there are comparable fees and expenses 
involved in maintaining an individual account. 
 17. See BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 209–10 (6th ed. 
1996) (suggesting that outside of insider trading there does not appear to be significant 
unexploited investment opportunities). 
 18. Note that trading for rebalancing may work in the opposite way as trading for tax 
reasons. 
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To get a sense of how much trading is attributable to these strategies, 
we can look to readily available data on the trading habits of mutual funds.  
Over the years 1974 to 2009, average share turnover in all mutual funds has 
been about 58% per year.
19
  As one might expect, there is less share 
turnover in index funds.  For example, Vanguard reports that average 
annual turnover in its index funds is about 14% for general domestic stock 
funds and about 32% for more aggressive domestic stock funds.  Finally, 
annual turnover in the S&P 500 index itself is about 5%.
20
 
With this data, we can begin to estimate how often such an investor 
would be a buyer, a seller, or a holder of a fraud-affected stock.  But, in 
 
 19. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 28 
(50th ed. 2010). 
 20. Richard A. Booth, The Buzzard Was Their Friend—Hedge Funds and the Problem 
of Overvalued Equity, 10 U. PENN. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 879, 897 (2008).  In contrast, market 
wide turnover among New York Stock Exchange listed stocks is about 130%. Fact Book 
Online, NYSE Group Turnover, NYXDATA.COM, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/ 
factbook/main.asp (follow “Market Activity” hyperlink, then follow “NYSE Group 
Turnover” hyperlink). Recent studies estimate that in the United States, in the years since 
2000, only about twenty-four percent of all trading is motivated by stock picking.  That 
figure appears to be on the decline.  See, e.g., Utpal Bhattacharya & Neal E. Galpin, The 
Global Rise of the Value-Weighted Portfolio (American Finance Association, Chicago 
Meetings Paper, 2007) (finding that about three-quarters of trading is motivated other than 
by stock picking). See also Martijn Cremers & Jianping Mei, Turning Over Turnover (Yale 
ICF Working Paper No. 03-26, 2004); Meir Statman, et al., Investor Overconfidence and 
Trading Volume, (American Finance Association, San Diego Meetings Paper, 2003).  But 
see Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure 
that Predicts Performance, (American Finance Association, Chicago Meetings Paper, 2007) 
(finding that more active managers of non-index funds outperform less active managers). 
For a treatment of trading frequency from a legal point of view.  See Paul G. Mahoney, Is 
There a Cure for “Excessive” Trading?, 81 VA. L. REV. 713 (1995) (examining the role of 
securities regulation and regulation of financial intermediaries such as banks  and mutual 
funds on trading frequency).  See also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? 
Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995) 
(discussing the need to revisit the laissez-faire structure of securities law, which encourages 
trading, if the heterogeneous expectations model, which questions the societal benefit of 
stock trading, accurately describes consumer stock purchasing decisions); Lynn A. Stout, 
Reply: Agreeing to Disagree over Excessive Trading, 81 VA. L. REV. 751, 755 (1995) 
(arguing “a purely laissez-faire approach to stock markets can invite welfare losses that 
might be avoided under a regulatory scheme designed to reduce the dispersion of investors’ 
expectations, decrease the costs of their mistakes, or hasten their learning”).  Bhattacharya 
and Galpin also find that in the United States in the 1960s about 60% of trading was 
motivated by stock picking.  They predict that the level of stock picking will continue to 
decline and stabilize at about 11%.  It is not surprising that securities fraud class actions 
became established at a time when most investors focused on company-specific factors.  
Bhattacharya & Galpin, supra, at 19–20.  It is possible that the mix of investors varies from 
one corporation to the next.  For example, it is possible that a particular corporation may 
attract the disproportionate attention of stock pickers.  But for most companies, most trading 
appears to be motivated by other factors. 
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order to complete the picture, one also needs data about the population of 
public companies and the frequency of securities fraud class actions. 
B.  Trading Style and the Effect of Litigation 
There are about 6100 publicly traded companies listed on US stock 
exchanges.
21
  On average there are 195 securities fraud class actions filed 
each year.
22
  Thus, on average, about one in thirty-one companies will be 
the target of a class action in any given year. 
Consider an investor with a $1,000,000 portfolio consisting of 500 
stocks that are equally weighted by dollar value.  In other words, the 
investor holds $2000 worth of each of the 500 stocks.  Assume that 
turnover is 14% per year, the average of Vanguard index funds, and that 
when an investor sells a stock, she sells all of that stock that she owns and 
uses the proceeds to buy another stock that she does not currently hold.  
Thus, the investor sells $140,000 in 70 different stocks and buys $140,000 
in seventy other different stocks during the course of a year.  On average, 
the investor can expect that a class action will be filed in connection with 
about two of the stocks she sells, two of the stocks she buys, and fourteen 
of the stocks she holds.
23
  Assume further that each of the fraud-affected 
stocks would have fallen in price by 10% based solely on the disclosure of 
bad news (without any feedback effect).  Finally, assume that the plaintiff 
class comprises 50% of the company’s stockholders in each case. 
In a world without securities fraud class actions, the hypothetical 
investor would lose 10% of the value of each of the two stocks she buys 
and the fourteen stocks she holds.  She would avoid losses on the two 
stocks she sold.
24
  Her total loss would thus be $3200. 
In a world with securities fraud class actions, each fraud-affected stock 
would decline in value by 20% or $400.  That is, it would decline $200 
from the fundamental decline in price and $200 more from the feedback 
effect that results from the payout to the plaintiff class.
25
  Thus, the investor 
 
 21. Author analysis of Center for Research on Securities Prices (“CRSP”) data through 
2008 (on file with author).  The number of public companies has decreased rather 
dramatically from a high of 9027 in 1997 because of new SEC and NASDAQ rules that 
require all companies traded on an electronic quotation system to be registered for purposes 
of continuous reporting under the 1934 Act. 
 22. 2010 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 1. This includes a small number of 
foreign companies. See data in Appendix infra. 
 23. This assumes that the average fraud period is one year. And indeed the average 
fraud period is about 300 days.  Study on file with author. 
 24. It could be said that the investor actually enjoys a gain by selling the two overpriced 
stocks.  The point here is only to compare the ending value of the portfolio with and without 
a class action remedy. 
 25. If the plaintiff class comprises 50% of the outstanding shares, the feedback effect in 
a bad news case will cause the stock price to decline by exactly twice the amount that it 
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would recover her losses on the two stocks she bought, less fees and 
expenses.  Assuming fees and expenses equal to 20% of recovery—$80 for 
each stock—her net loss would be $160.
26
  Again, she would avoid losses 
on the two stocks that she sold, but she would lose $400 on each of the 
fourteen stocks that she held.  The investor’s total loss would thus be 
$5600. 
Finally, if the investor opted out of the two class actions in which she 
was a member of the plaintiff class, she would lose $400 on each of those 
two stocks, for a total loss of $6400, including both stocks bought and 
stocks held.  The following chart sets forth these results: 
 
 NO CLASS ACTION CLASS ACTION OPT OUT 
BUY (2) (400) (160) (800) 
HOLD (14) (2800) (5600) (5600) 
TOTAL (3200) (5760) (6400) 
 
Clearly, this investor would be better off in a world without securities 
fraud class actions.  But, if any of the class actions in which she is a buyer 
proceeds, she would decline to opt out because by doing so she would be 
even worse off.  Moreover, and for similar reasons, this investor would 
favor a class action remedy if it is likely that class actions will be 
prosecuted in the cases in which she is a mere holder.  If class actions are 
prosecuted in these cases, she loses as a holder because buyers get paid.  So 
she would want the class action to proceed when she is a buyer in order to 
get her fair share of the total pot.  In short, securities fraud class actions 
give rise to a classic market failure in which investors behave contrary to 
their true interests. 
 
would have declined in the absence of a class action. The appendix to this paper includes the 
relevant formulas and calculations. This decline does not include losses from litigation 
expenses or increased cost of capital.  These elements of damages are discussed further 
below. 
 26. Again, plaintiff attorney fees and other litigation expenses are paid out of the 
settlement.  These fees and expenses average about 20% of the gross settlement amount.  
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  The calculations here assume that the total 
recovery (gross before litigation expenses) is equal to 100% of the investor loss.  That is 
never the case.  But if the recovery is less than 100% the loss on stocks held should be 
reduced too. 
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The assumption in the above analysis is that the investor trades at a 
turnover rate of 14%.  Needless to say, investors may trade more or less 
than at that rate.  The following chart shows how investors fare when they 
trade at different turnover rates: 
TURNOVER 0% 10% 25% 50% 100% 
BUY 0/0 2/(160) 4/(320) 8/(640) 16/(1280) 
HOLD 16/(6400) 14/(5600) 12/(4800) 8/(3200) 0/0 
TOTAL (6400) (5760) (5120) (3840) (1280) 
 
As the chart shows, investors who trade relatively little are the big 
losers from securities fraud class actions.  Ironically, the conventional 
wisdom is that the best investment strategy is to buy and hold since it is 
impossible to beat the market picking stocks and since trading is costly.  
Yet securities fraud class actions punish such investors in effect by 
transferring wealth to investors who engage in stock-picking and trade 
more often.  In other words, securities fraud class actions are doubly 
inconsistent with the interests of reasonable investors.  They protect against 
risks that can more cheaply be avoided through diversification, and they 
penalize investors who follow a buy and hold strategy.
27
 
C.  Portfolio Balancing 
The foregoing analysis is somewhat unrealistic.  In the real world, a 
diversified investor often buys more of a stock that is already in her 
portfolio or sells some but not all of the shares of a stock in her portfolio 
simply to rebalance the portfolio.
28
  For example, suppose that one of her 
 
 27. Although the chart is reasonably realistic at lower levels of turnover, it suggests 
somewhat unrealistically that an investor who trades at a turnover rate of 100% would suffer 
no holding losses. This might be close to true if the investor sold every stock every year and 
replaced those stocks with other stocks. But it is probably more typical for an investor to 
hold some stocks for longer periods and to trade some stocks even more often than once a 
year.  In other words, the turnover rate is an average.  But even if an investor trades every 
stock in his portfolio for a different stock every year, the average fraud period of about one 
year is itself an average.  So the investor will likely be a holder of some stocks with 
relatively short fraud periods.  
 28. See, e.g., Carla Fried, 3 Men, 3 Strategies, But All Lead to Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
10, 2005, at B30 (using rebalancing to take emotion out of investing and give investments 
time to work out); Mark Hulbert, If You Know Options, You’re Likely to Know Stocks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at B7 (showing that rebalancing options in a portfolio can be a highly 
successful trading strategy); Paul J. Lim, Cash May Not Be King, but It’s Wielding More 
Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, at B5 (discussing the impact of historical returns on cash 
on portfolio management strategies); Paul J. Lim, Hitting the Reset Button on Your 401(k), 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at B5 (detailing the importance of rebalancing a 401(k) portfolio 
for the average investor); Paul J. Lim, When It Comes to Rebalancing, a Little Means a Lot, 
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500 stocks—Acme Fireworks—has decreased in total value to $1500 while 
another—Binford Tools—has increased to $2500.  She sells $500 worth of 
Binford and buys $500 worth of Acme to rebalance her portfolio.  Shortly 
after these trades, Acme announces a restatement of earnings.  Analysts 
revise their long-term projections for Acme downward by 10%.  Acme 
should decrease in price by 10% (other things equal).  But the stock settles 
at a price 20% lower because of the feedback effect from an anticipated 
class action.  Indeed, a class action is filed on behalf of investors who 
bought Acme during the fraud period.  On paper, the investor has lost $400 
on her Acme investment.  But she has standing to sue only with respect to 
the $500 purchase and hence stands to recover at most $100 less $20 in 
fees and expenses or $80 net.  So her best-case loss on Acme stock will be 
$320.  In the absence of a class action, the decline would be 10%.  And the 
investor would have a lost a total of $200 on her Acme investment. 
Clearly, this investor would oppose class certification irrespective of 
any other fraud-affected stocks she might hold.  In the previous example, 
where the diversified investor is assumed to trade all or nothing, she might 
want the class action to proceed so she can get her fair share on the 
assumption that she will effectively pay in all of the cases where she is a 
holder.  But not so for a portfolio-balancing investor.  She would want the 
court to deny certification of the action as a class action.  If the class action 
proceeds, she must seek her share of the recovery.  As with the all-or-
nothing trader, it would do no good for the portfolio-balancing investor to 




N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, at B5 (presenting rebalancing as means to mitigate the impact of 
market volatility on securities portfolios); Joseph Nocera, No, You Can’t Invest Like Yale. 
Sorry!, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at C1 (analyzing Yale’s portfolio approach to investing 
its endowment); J. Alex Tarquinio, Oops, It May Be Time to Rebalance That Portfolio, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 2007, at C4 (encouraging investors to rebalance their portfolios to take 
advantage of the benefits of asset class diversification).  It is also quite common for 
investors to engage in dollar cost averaging.  That is a roundabout way of saying that they 
invest over time as they accumulate savings.  Such a strategy is similar to portfolio 
balancing.  Indeed, unless a dollar cost averaging investor chooses new stocks for each new 
addition of cash to his portfolio, he effectively engages in portfolio balancing by default. 
 29. The assumption in the foregoing discussion has been that portfolio-balancing 
investors buy because the value of the subject shares in their portfolios has declined below 
some target percentage. That can happen in several different ways:  (1) the shares may have 
fallen in value, (2) the remainder of the market may have risen in value, or (3) investors may 
have added cash to their portfolios.  In addition, there is more than one way to balance a 
portfolio.  For example, an index fund typically seeks to hold shares in proportion to market 
capitalization (or public float).  Thus, an index fund will be a buyer when the price of the 
subject stock rises relative to the rest of the market.  In other words, portfolio balancing may 
lead some investors to sell and other investors to buy.  Because of the mix of investor 
strategies, it is quite possible for portfolio-balancing investors to account for a large 
proportion of the class.  Moreover, since index funds (and indeed all funds) tend to buy 
stocks that increase in value, and since fraud-affected stocks are by definition overvalued, it 
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In the end, it seems likely that portfolio-balancing investors dominate 
the investor population simply because two-thirds of all stock is held by 
well-diversified institutions.  But it is not the point here to determine what 
style of investing predominates.  It is enough to show that a significant 
number of investors in any plaintiff class will be opposed to class action 
certification because they will lose more than they will win if the class 
action succeeds.  In other words, it is not necessary to show that all 
diversified investors would oppose certification.  It suffices to show that 
the interests of investors differ enough that the courts should decline to 
certify securities fraud actions as class actions.
30
 
D.  The Relevance of Insurance 
To be clear, the idea that some investors lose more than they gain 
from a class action ultimately depends on the fact that the stock price of the 
defendant company falls by more than it should as a result of the feedback 
effect that arises because the company pays.  It might be argued that where 
the award is covered by insurance (as it usually is), there may be no 
feedback effect and no reason for anyone to object to class certification.  
Indeed, many cases are settled for whatever amount is available from the 
defendant company’s insurance.  There are several responses to the idea 
that insurance may eliminate feedback. 
First, we should assess the social value of securities litigation (and any 
other legal right or obligation) on its own merits.  The law is that the 
defendant company compensates buyers who suffer a loss.  The fact that 
the bill may be paid by an insurance company is irrelevant.  There would 
be no bill but for the imposition of liability.  That is why evidence of 
insurance is generally inadmissible.
31
 
Second, if insurance is depleted by securities litigation it will be 
unavailable for other purposes.  For example, if the defendant company is 
sued for products liability or pollution, there will be no insurance coverage 
remaining.  If the company must pay other claims out of its own pocket, it 
may fail altogether.  In a sense, insurance is part of the capitalization of the 
company in that it protects the company from unforeseeable major 
 
may be that funds are somewhat more likely to be buyers of fraud-affected stocks than they 
are to be sellers.  On the other hand, many individual investors (traders) seem to focus on 
momentum.  So they may also be unusually inclined to buy fraud-affected stocks.  But since 
momentum investors tend to be active traders, they are also more likely to have sold a fraud-
affected stock before corrective disclosure. 
 30. The appendix includes an extended discussion of portfolio balancing including 
examples of some extreme situations in which portfolio-balancing investors may favor class 
actions. 
 31. See FED. R. EVID. 411 (stating evidence of insurance is inadmissible to prove 
negligence or wrongdoing). 
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  So it is not costless—nor a matter of sunk cost—to have the 
insurer pay. 
Third, if the insurance company pays, the insured will pay higher rates 
for insurance in the future.  That reduces expected return and thus stock 
price.  So in the end it really makes no difference whether the insurance 
company pays.  When the insurance company pays, it really only finances 
the award.  In effect, the defendant company pays over time.  Thus, there is 
good reason to think that feedback happens whether or not the award is 
paid by insurance. 
Fourth, when an insurance company pays, rates go up for all potential 
defendant companies.  Every successful securities fraud action raises the 
risk of future such actions.  When insurance rates go up, investor return—
and hence stock price—goes down.  In other words, the feedback echoes 
throughout the market.  Thus, diversified investors may lose even more as 
holders of stocks other than fraud-affected stocks.  So diversified investors 
may well oppose certification even in cases in which they might appear to 
gain if the effect is measured simply with regard to the fraud-affected 
stock. 
Needless to say, when a third party such as a tort victim makes a claim 
against a corporation, she wants to collect as much as possible.  It does not 
matter if insurance coverage for other claims is thus reduced, or if 
premiums increase and the market value of the company declines, or if the 
company is rendered bankrupt in the process.  But where the claimant is a 
stockholder as in the typical securities fraud class action, there is a conflict 
between the interests of stockholders who would collect and stockholders 
who would not.  Indeed, even for stockholders who would collect there is a 
downside in that they may do more harm to the value of the stock they hold 
than they recover on the stock they bought.  The situation is really no 
different from one in which a homeowner or an automobile owner may 
decline to make a claim for fear that his rates will increase in the future or 
that his insurance will be cancelled.  In short, the fact that securities fraud 
class action settlements are often paid by insurance is irrelevant to the 
question of whether such actions are consistent with the interests of 
investors. 
II. THE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES 
The foregoing discussion has focused on the conflicts between 
investors who benefit from securities fraud class actions and investors who 
lose from them.  The fact that a significant number of potential class 
 
 32. See Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 310 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
the issue of insurance is unquestionably related to capitalization). 
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members would object is a sufficient reason to deny certification, but it is 
not the only reason to do so.  Investors who would oppose certification 
would also presumably favor prosecution of a derivative action since in any 
meritorious case a significant part of the decrease in stock value will be the 
result of expenses incurred by the defendant company in connection with 
the litigation—including attorney fees and possibly fines as well as 
amounts paid out to the plaintiff class.  Moreover, to plead a valid claim 
under Rule 10b-5, it must be shown that high-level officers of the 
defendant company acted with scienter—that they deceived the market with 
some sort of intent.
33
  Thus, it seems likely that in any action that survives a 
motion to dismiss, the company will suffer reputational harm that will have 
the effect of increasing its cost of capital and further decreasing its stock 
price.  Finally, the issuer company may also have a claim for restitution if 
there has been insider trading or misappropriation of some other sort. 
To be clear, it is not the argument here that buyer-holders should have 
a claim under federal law as holders.  The law is well settled that only 
buyers have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5.
34
  Holders have no claim 
under Rule 10b-5 simply because stock price fell.  Nevertheless, holders 
(including buyers) may have a derivative claim based on the theory that 
management malfeasance caused the stock price to fall further than it 
would have fallen if management had simply told the truth when it should 
have done so.  Indeed, federal securities law expressly preserves the right 
of stockholders to assert derivative claims under state law irrespective of 
whether the named plaintiff is a buyer or a holder and when such claims are 
ultimately based on a theory of non-disclosure.
35
 
At first blush, it might seem that an undiversified investor should have 
no objection to a derivative action.  Indeed, it is quite common in the real 




 33. The Supreme Court defined scienter in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 
194 (1976), as intent to manipulate, deceive, or defraud. 
 34. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 (1975) (holding the 
private right of action under 10b-5 is limited to those who actually purchase or sell 
securities). 
 35. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) 
(stating that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”) preempted class 
actions by non-traders but that SLUSA preserved derivative actions brought by shareholders 
on behalf of a corporation).  The implications of SLUSA are discussed in more detail below. 
 36. It appears that the number of side-by-side derivative actions has increased 
significantly in recent years.  About 45% of all cases settled in 2009 were accompanied by 
derivative actions.  Although this number is down somewhat from 55% in 2007, it is up 
significantly from 35% in 2005.  ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE 
RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS, 2009 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 11 (2009) 
[hereinafter 2009 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS]; 2005 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 11.  
Moreover, although derivative actions are often settled in exchange for governance reforms 
and without any explicit monetary damages, the settlement amount in class actions 
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But there are subtle conflicts between the two actions.  In a derivative 
action, the award (if any) goes to the company.  The fact that the company 
recovers means that its stock price should rise somewhat, thus decreasing 
any award in the class action.  Accordingly, it seems quite clear that the 
derivative action must be resolved first before the class claim can even be 
measured.  But in practice a derivative action is usually treated as an 




The interrelationship of derivative claims and class claims is easier to 
see in the context of an example.  Suppose that Duff Brewing Company has 
one million shares outstanding and trades for $20 per share for a market 
capitalization of $20 million. The analysts expect Duff to report earnings of 
$2.00 per share for the coming year.  Thus, Duff trades at ten times 
expected earnings.  In other words, the market values Duff stock such that 
its expected return on equity—its cost of equity—is ten percent. 
Duff management has failed to disclose that several restaurant chains 
have decided not to serve Duff beer because it is inexplicably loaded with 
cholesterol.  When the news finally comes out, the analysts revise their 
earnings predictions to $1.50 per share. 
One might expect Duff stock thus to fall to $15 per share other things 
equal.  But Duff shares fall to $10 per share.  Duff now trades at 6.66 times 
earnings.  In other words, the market values Duff stock such that its cost of 
equity is 15%.  What accounts for the additional decrease in price and the 
increase in the cost of equity?  There are two (or three) possible answers. 
First, the additional decline may have come from the prospect of 
securities litigation.  Although one might have thought that Duff would 
now be worth a total of $15 million, maybe the market thinks that it will be 
required to pay out $5 million in damages to those who bought during the 
fraud period.  (I refer to this portion of the loss as feedback damages.)  In 
addition, Duff is likely to suffer significant expenses in defending itself, 
including substantial attorney fees as well as the cost of management 
distraction.  Duff may also pay out substantial sums in fines as well as 
 
accompanied by derivative actions tends to be higher than in stand-alone class actions.  See 
2009 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, supra note 36, at 11 (showing that lawsuits with derivative 
action settle for a median of $11.8 million while lawsuits without derivative action settle for 
$5.2 million). 
 37. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 243–46 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding 
derivative plaintiff could not intervene in or stop investor class action suit against 
corporation and individual directors). See also In re Chambers Dev. Sec. Litig., 912 F. 
Supp. 822, 841 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (describing a derivative action as a mere appendage and 
discussing proposed settlement in which entire amount to be recovered by the corporation 
would go to derivative plaintiff counsel, or if not approved, into class action pot).  But see In 
re Zoran Corp. Derivative Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 986 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting settlement 
because of minimal payment proposed). 
BOOTH_FINALIZEDTHREE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012  11:24 AM 
722 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
increased insurance premiums going forward.  (I refer to this portion of the 
loss as litigation damages.) 
Second, another possibility is that the market now sees Duff as riskier 
than it did before the bad news came out.  So instead of requiring a 10% 
return on equity, the market now requires a 15% return on equity.  (I refer 
to this portion of the loss as cost of capital damages.) 
This second possibility itself may come from two distinct sources.  It 
may be that the market learned something new about the beer business 
from these events and now sees brewing companies in general as riskier 
than previously thought.  Or it may be that the market has lost trust in Duff 
in particular because of the cover-up of information about cancelled 
restaurant contracts.  The market may suspect that there is more bad 
information that is being covered up or that when bad things happen Duff 
will not inform the market as promptly as it should.
38
 
Needless to say, the additional decline in the value of Duff stock may 
be attributable to some combination of these factors.  But the important 
point for present purposes is that these elements of damages that constitute 
the additional $5 decline in excess of the expected decline from $20 to 
$15—are claims that should be characterized as derivative because they 
affect all Duff stockholders in the same way.  This is easiest to see if the 
claim is based on a loss of trust theory.  If the company must now pay 15% 
for equity because the market distrusts management, it seems quite clear 
that the company as a whole has been damaged.  On the other hand, the 
increased cost of equity may also be perfectly innocent.  It may be that the 
market simply learned something new about the brewing business.  It is not 
really important to resolve the question whether the increase in the cost of 
equity can be traced to an innocent or actionable source.  That can be 




 38. This is a classic market for lemons problem. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for 
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490–93 
(1970) (discussing used car market as an example of how asymmetric information can 
reduce overall quality in a market by causing good quality producers to leave the market to 
avoid being tainted by actions of lower quality peers). 
 39. It should be relatively easy to determine whether the excess decline is innocent or 
actionable.  If it is innocent then all comparable companies should have been similarly 
affected by the news.  If the excess decline is peculiar to the defendant company, then it 
presumably comes from actionable reputational harm.  (It is also possible that loss 
attributable to an increase in the cost of equity may come from both innocent and actionable 
sources.  But again it should be easy enough to sort these out by reference to comparable 
companies).  This determination is somewhat complicated by the possibility that some of the 
excess decline may be attributable to the prospect of payout—feedback damages.  But in 
practice it should not matter much.  Presumably, the class action will be dismissed in the 
absence of pleaded facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 
(2010).  In most cases where the increase in the cost of equity is actionable, there will also 
be feedback damages.  And in most cases where the increase in the cost of equity is 
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A similar analysis applies if the excess loss comes from feedback and 
other costs or expenses associated with securities litigation.  If the company 
declines in value by more than it should—by more than $5—this excess 
loss is one that affects all of the stockholders in the same way.  So holders 
(together with buyers) clearly have a valid derivative claim for this element 
of damages.  The corporation has suffered an injury because of the 
malfeasance of high-level officers to the extent that it has been required to 
pay the claims of fraud victims.  If there had been no fraud, the corporation 
would be that much better off. 
There can be little doubt that a corporation is harmed when the actions 
of its directors or officers result in an increase in the cost of capital.  
Accordingly, there can be little doubt that under the proper circumstances 
directors and officers can be held liable for such an injury to the 
corporation.
40
  Although one might object that the derivative claim arises in 
part as a result of the class claim—because of feedback—it is nonetheless 
clear that such an injury to the value of the corporation gives rise to a claim 
in the right of the corporation.
41
  Buyers can recover under Rule 10b-5 only 
 
innocent, there will be no feedback damages.  In other words, it is likely that either both 
elements of damages will be present or neither element will be present.  To be sure, this 
assumes that defendant companies do not pay except in meritorious cases.  That is not 
clearly true.  See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 499–501 (1991) (finding little relation 
between the merits and the settlement values of securities class actions).  But it is not clearly 
relevant either.  Any time the company pays there will be a colorable derivative claim that 
arises from the loss in value attributable to the payout.  Moreover, if there is no class action, 
there is no feedback.  Thus, in a world without class actions, it will be that much easier to 
measure any loss from an increase in the cost of capital. 
40.Although I have found no case that explicitly discusses an increase in the cost of capital 
as a loss, Delaware law recognizes that the board of directors may be held liable in a 
properly pleaded derivative action for any loss from a breach of the duty of candor—a 
failure of disclosure—even in the absence of a request for stockholder action.  See Malone 
v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (stating directors have fiduciary duties to 
shareholders whenever they communicate with them either publicly or directly). See also In 
re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 241–42 (holding a corporation might be able to recover 
from its officers and agents as a result of losses suffered from an improvident settlement of a 
securities fraud class action).  Moreover, there are a number of cases that recognize that the 
directors and officers may be held liable for paying too much or accepting too little even 
though there are relatively few cases that ultimately hold directors or officers liable for such 
losses.  See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding potential liability 
for bank directors who continued to authorize loans to indebted builder in “no-win” 
situation); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985) (holding directors liable 
for failing to properly inform themselves about the origins and financial merits of a merger 
orchestrated by the CEO). 
 41. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370–73 (Del. 2006) (discussing a derivative 
action based on fines paid because of money laundering violations); Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130–33 (Del. 1963) (discussing a derivative action based 
on allegations of antitrust violations); In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 
959, 960–66 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing a derivative action based on fines and civil claims 
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if they can show that directors or officers acted with scienter in failing to 
disclose material information to the market.
42
  The same standard applies 
under state law.  The business judgment rule protects directors and officers 
from liability only for actions taken in good faith.  If it can be shown that 
their actions were the result of a breach of the duty of loyalty—which 
includes actions taken in bad faith—or were not in fact the product of a 
valid business judgment—which is the same thing—the business judgment 
rule does not apply.
43
  The same is true if the corporation has adopted an 
exculpatory provision, such as under Delaware General Corporate Law 
section 102(b)(7), which clearly does not extend to actions taken other than 
in good faith.
44
  In short, neither the business judgment rule nor an 




for violations of Medicare anti-referral rules).  The law is also clear that the business 
judgment rule does not protect directors from liability to the corporation for illegal actions 
even if they are somehow for the benefit of the corporation. See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 
759, 761, 763–65 (3d Cir. 1974) (discussing a corporation that neglected to insist on 
payment due to it from political party even though failure to collect amounted to an illegal 
campaign contribution); Metro Commc’ns Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs., 
Inc., 854 A.2d 121,131 (Del. Ch. 2004) (explaining that a fiduciary may not manage a 
corporation in an illegal fashion even if to do so would increase profits).  Admittedly, all of 
these cases involved criminal actions albeit in combination with civil actions.  But there is 
nothing in the concept of the duty to monitor that limits it to criminal activity.  Moreover, 
securities fraud can be and often is prosecuted as a criminal matter as well as a civil matter. 
In Stone, Graham, and Caremark, the issue was whether the board of directors could be held 
liable to the stockholders for a failure to monitor the activities of subordinate officers that 
led to losses suffered by the corporation in connection with violations of law.  Although 
none of these cases resulted in a finding that the board of directors was in fact liable, none 
of the cases was dismissed for failure to state a claim.  In other words, each of the cases 
stated a valid cause of action against the board of directors.  A fortiori the corporation would 
have a valid claim against subordinate officers who actually caused the loss even if directors 
cannot be held liable.  One might object to the foregoing analysis because the elements of a 
fraud claim under federal law are quite different from the elements of a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty under state law—typically Delaware law.  Thus, for a court to rule that some 
elements of damages should be recovered in a derivative action would effect a substantive 
change in investor rights.  There are two responses.  One is: so what?  If the claim is in fact 
in a derivative action, it should be litigated as such.  The fact that no one has noticed the 
distinction up to now is of no moment.  Another (perhaps less flippant) response is that there 
is not really any difference between federal and state law in this regard. 
 42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2012). 
 44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012). 
 45. See Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (demonstrating that where 
directors are exculpated from liability, except for claims based on fraudulent, illegal, or bad 
faith conduct, plaintiff must plead particularized facts that demonstrate directors acted with 
scienter—that they had actual or constructive knowledge that their conduct was legally 
improper); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 945 (Del. Ch. 2007) (demonstrating that 
where directors are exculpated from liability, except for claims based on fraudulent, illegal, 
or bad faith conduct, plaintiff must plead particularized facts that demonstrate directors 
acted with scienter); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753–56 
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Thus, whenever there is a valid buyer claim, there is by definition, a 
valid derivative claim.  Assuming that scienter means the same thing in 
state court as it does in federal court, any such finding in a federal court 
ought to be good enough for a state court. So it seems likely that the same 
standard of behavior would apply to any claim based on an increase in the 
cost of capital as applies in the typical securities fraud class action.  The 
point is that if there is a valid claim, it is derivative at least in part.
46
 
A.  Derivative Actions in Practice 
The problem is that under federal law, investors who bought during 
the fraud period have a claim for the entire $10 loss they suffered.
47
  As we 
have seen, $5 of that loss is in fact a derivative claim that affects all of the 
shares in exactly the same way. The company lost value—over and above 
the decrease in price that came from the bad news itself—because of 
management malfeasance in handling the disclosure of the bad news.  The 
claim for the additional loss should thus be asserted by or on behalf of the 
company against directors, officers, or other agents for the benefit of all of 
the stockholders.  But the question is when should the derivative claim be 
asserted? 
Given that the class claim is a federal claim and that the derivative 
claim is a state claim, one might assume that the federal claim should take 
precedence and should be resolved first.
48
  That is the standard practice 
 
(Del. Ch. 2005) (demonstrating that intentional harm clearly constitutes bad faith). 
 46. This is not to suggest that a derivative claim based on an increase in cost of 
capital—or other harms—will arise only in cases giving rise to a class action under Rule 
10b-5.  Indeed, such claims may well arise in situations in which buyers have no federal 
claim. 
 47. At least this is the standard approach to damages as a matter of current practice.  
The Supreme Court has never ruled on what should be the measure of damages in a 
securities fraud class action.  Indeed, the Court expressly reserved the question in Basic, Inc. 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988).  On the other hand, this is the approach to damages 
on which Congress relied in PSLRA.  It is arguable that it is implicit in statutory law.  
Moreover, one could argue that the Supreme Court effectively endorsed this approach in 
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) in holding that proof of loss causation 
requires a price correction. Accord In re Initial Pub. Offering (IPO) Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 
(2d Cir. 2006). See also Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 
F.3d 189, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2003) (demonstrating that a plaintiff must allege price correction 
to plead loss causation). 
     48. But see Brandin v. Deason, 2007 WL 2088877 (Del. Ch.) (declining to defer to a 
derivative action later filed in federal court where the federal securities law claims were 
predicated on the same conduct giving rise to the state law derivative claims).  It is possible 
that the derivative claim also arises under federal law.  For example, one could argue that 
reputational harm suffered by the corporation is in connection with trading in its stock and 
thus within the contemplation of Rule 10b-5 even though the corporation itself did not buy 
or sell any stock.  Indeed, federal securities law expressly contemplates recovery by the 
corporation (via derivative action if necessary) in cases of short-swing trading even though 
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when a derivative claim is filed alongside a class claim.  Indeed, the 
monetary recovery almost always goes to the class, while the derivative 
claim is typically settled by the corporation adopting governance reforms 
or other similar nonmonetary measures of dubious value.  (Nevertheless, 
the plaintiff lawyers in a “successful” derivative action usually get paid 
well for their work). 
As suggested above, there are good reasons why the derivative action 
should be resolved first.  To be specific, it is impossible to know how much 
damage the buyers have suffered until it is determined how much of the 
price decrease is attributable to litigation expense or an increase in the cost 
of capital since if the corporation recovers in the derivative action its stock 
price will presumably rebound to reflect the recovery.
49
  But there are other 
more compelling reasons why the derivative claim should be resolved first. 
To return to the Duff Beer example, recall that stock price falls from 
$20 to $10 on news that should have caused a decrease only to $15.  Thus, 
buyers suffer a loss of $10 per share.  Assume (1) that $2 per share of the 
damages is attributable to litigation expense or an actionable increase in the 
cost of capital, (2) that $3 per share in damages is attributable to feedback, 





If the class action is litigated first, the class recovers $3M and stock 
price settles at $10.  The corporation then recovers $5M in the derivative 
action and stock price climbs back to $15. In the end, the class is 
overcompensated.  Since stock price finally settles at $15, the class should 
have recovered only $1.5 million. 
 
the corporation itself did not trade.  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78p(b) (2006).  Moreover, it is possible that a federal court could assume supplemental 
jurisdiction over a state law derivative action, but it would likely be dismissed if the class is 
not certified since the plaintiffs would likely drop their direct claims that arise under federal 
law.  It does not matter to the thesis here whether the corporate claim arises under state law 
or federal law.  All that matters is that there is a claim.  
 49. It is no response to this analysis that stock prices might not behave as expected—for 
example that the derivative recovery might not result in a dollar-for-dollar increase in the 
market capitalization of the company. 
 50. If the class consists of 30% of the shares, a 35% decrease in price (from $20 to $13) 
becomes a 50% decrease in price because of feedback.  See formulas and explanation in 
Appendix infra. 
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Scenario II 
If the derivative action is litigated first—and we assume that a class 
action will follow—the corporation recovers $5 million and stock price 
climbs back to $15.  The class then recovers $1.5 million from the 
corporation—which the corporation effectively pays out of its recovery.  
And stock price drops back to $13.50. That arguably would give rise to 
another derivative action.  The bottom line is that the corporation must 
eventually recover enough from the individual wrongdoers so that stock 
price will finally settle at $15.  Thus, if the corporation recovers $6.5 
million and pays $1.5 million to the buyers, everyone ends up in the right 
place.
51
  The problem with this scenario is that the corporation recovers too 
much.  The market price would never drop so much in the first place if the 
expectation was that the corporation would recover enough from the 
individual wrongdoers to eliminate all losses beyond the initial $5.  So it is 
not immediately clear how much the corporation should recover. 
Scenario III 
There is a third scenario that should also be considered.  The second 
scenario—where the derivative action is litigated first—is roughly 
equivalent to a derivative action in which part of the recovery is paid to 
individual stockholders rather than to the corporation.  But if that were 
really the remedy, the corporation would recover $2 million and buyers 
would recover $1.5 million—both from the individual wrongdoers.  Stock 
price would still settle at $15—because of the elimination of feedback—
which is exactly where it would have settled in the absence of any fraud.  




As these three scenarios show, the aggregate amount of damages paid 
depends on the order in which the claims are resolved.  In the first scenario, 
the total payout is $8 million.  In the second scenario, the total payout is 
$6.5 million.  And in the third scenario, the total payout is $3.5 million.  In 
the first scenario, the buyers recover too much.  In the second scenario, the 
corporation may recover too much.  Just as in Goldilocks, the third scenario 
is just right. 
Needless to say, the various price adjustments described here would 
happen more or less instantaneously as the market processes the 
 
 51. It is not clear that the corporation could legally distribute part of the recovery to the 
buyers and to the exclusion of other holders since any such distribution might be seen as a 
non pro rata dividend. 
 52. For the sake of completeness, in the absence of recovery by the corporation, the 
buyers would suffer a $7 loss per share and would thus recover $2.1 million. 
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possibilities and probabilities.  But how the market reacts depends in large 
part on what the law is.  As the law currently stands, market price should 
drop to $10.  But if the market expected the third scenario to ensue, it 
would presumably react quite differently. 
There is a possible paradox lurking here.  If the market expects that a 
class action will follow from corrective disclosure, then one might think 
that the drop in the market price would be mitigated somewhat by the 
prospect of recovery.  Not so.  With a class action remedy, the recovery 
goes to the buyer (even if the buyer later sells his stock).  So there is no 
opportunity for arbitrage and no reason for the price to reflect the prospect 
of recovery.
53
  The effect on price is as if the stock has gone ex dividend.  
On the other hand, in a derivative action, the recovery goes to the 
corporation.  So if the market expects corrective disclosure to be followed 
by a derivative action, the price decrease is likely to be somewhat muted by 
the prospect of the corporation’s ultimate recovery.  The bottom line is that 
price is not likely to drop as much as one would expect, which would 
decrease the ultimate recovery.  Finally, if for some reason the market 
expects a derivative action in which individual buyers—but not the 
corporation—recover from individual wrongdoers, then presumably 




It is difficult to see how a court could choose to resolve a purported 
class action other than under the third scenario.  If all of the claims can be 
satisfied with a smaller payment, presumably a court would so conduct the 
litigation.
55
  To be sure, the third scenario requires that the court order 
individual recovery in a derivative action.  And there is some precedent for 




 53. On the other hand, market price might not be affected at all (other than to reflect a 
fundamental decrease in value) if the market does not think that a meritorious class action 
will follow.  Even if at first the market reacts to the prospect of a meritorious class action, 
stock price might recover somewhat if it later appears that the action will be dismissed.  
Needless to say, these possibilities complicate any empirical analysis of the price effect of 
class actions. 
 54. This assumes that buyers would recover even if they have sold following corrective 
disclosure, even though it is not clear that they have standing to do so, since Rule 23.1 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a derivative plaintiff remain a stockholder 
throughout the derivative action.  To be sure, this rule may apply only to a representative 
plaintiff. But the rule is not at all clear on this point.  Needless to say, in the real world 
stockholders will continue to trade during the pendency of the derivative action.  So this 
may be another reason why only the corporation should recover.  Diversified investors are 
unlikely to care much since they are just as likely to buy into a recovery as to miss one 
because they sold. 
 55. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955) (ordering individual 
recovery in part because aggregate award would be smaller). 
 56. There is substantial authority for individual recovery in a derivative action in 
appropriate cases.  AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 7.18(e) (1994).  
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To be clear, in a derivative action—even one with individual 
recovery—the corporation is the real plaintiff.  The corporation recovers. 
Since the individual wrongdoers pay, there is no feedback and no reason 
for any stockholder to object to the compensation received by others as 
long as everyone is compensated in full.  But to be realistic, full 
compensation is unlikely even though the aggregate recovery will almost 
certainly be smaller under the third scenario than it would be under the first 
scenario—the existing regime. 
Thus, the question is, how should the recovery be distributed if there 
is not enough to satisfy all claims?  The answer is that corporate claims 
should be satisfied first.  Individual claims should be paid only if corporate 
claims are paid in full.  There are several good reasons for this result. 
First, since individual recovery is an extraordinary remedy, a court is 
not likely to opt for such a remedy unless there are excess funds available.  
Admittedly, this is a technical and lawyerly argument that has little to do 
with the merits.  Nevertheless, both the federal courts and the Delaware 
courts have expressed clear hostility to individual recovery. 
Second, one gets more bang for the buck with corporate recovery as 
opposed to individual recovery.  As noted above, if a court in a derivative 
action orders individual recovery without corporate recovery, the buyers in 
the Duff example must be paid $2.1 million to be fully compensated, 
whereas their claim is just $1.5 million if the corporation first recovers $2 
million through a derivative action. 
Third, if buyers get paid ahead of corporate claims, intra-class 
conflicts can arise.  For example, if Duff buyers were to recover $2.1 
million while the corporation got zero, there will be a significant number of 
buyer-holders who would lose more from the lack of a derivative action 
than they would gain from individual recovery.  To be specific, any buyer 
who bought less than 22% of his shares during the fraud period would lose 
more from the lack of corporate recovery than she gains from individual 
 
See, e.g., Perlman, 219 F.2d at 178; see also Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & 
Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 714–18 (1974) (discussing the possibility of individual 
recovery); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).  But the Delaware 
courts have been quite hostile to the idea.  See Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 250 
(Del. 1970) (expressly rejecting Perlman as precedent); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904 
(Del. 1938).  But see Audio Visual Xperts, Inc. v. Walker, No. 17261-NC, 2000 WL 
222152, at *3 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding that a Pennsylvania court would likely permit 
individual recovery in a derivative action involving a closely held corporation).  In practice, 
individual recovery has been limited to situations in which wrongdoers would otherwise 
recover for their own wrongdoing or where some stockholders would enjoy a windfall 
because of the award.  Incidentally, it will almost always be the case that some stockholders 
enjoy a windfall.  Although the representative plaintiff in a derivative action must have held 
shares at the time of the wrong and must continue to hold shares until judgment, there is 
nothing to stop other stockholders from trading.  Indeed, there is every reason to expect 
arbitrage in connection with the prospect of a derivative recovery. 
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  To be sure, this conflict is not as significant as the one 
generated by a traditional class action, but it is real nonetheless.  No one 
should object, and no conflict should arise, if everyone is made whole.  But 
if individual recovery depletes the funds available for settlement, some 
buyer-holders will object.  Indeed, the courts have cited precisely this 
consideration in favoring derivative actions over class actions.  To be 
specific, when faced with a claim by an individual stockholder under 
circumstances in which other stockholders have been harmed in the same 
way, courts have held that the claim should proceed as a derivative action 
rather than a direct action since to permit one stockholder to recover would 
effectively harm the other stockholders who also have claims.
58
 
Fourth, one could argue that any payment to individual buyers 
amounts to an illegal non-pro-rata dividend if other stockholders would be 
left with shares worth less than they would have been worth in the absence 
of the fraud.  Although individual recovery presumably would be ordered 
by a court, a court is unlikely to issue any such order other than in the 
context of a settlement to which the corporation itself is a party.  But the 
fact remains that a derivative recovery belongs to the corporation in the 
first instance.  And any use of corporate funds to benefit some stockholders 
to the detriment and exclusion of others is contrary to law whether ordered 
by a court or as a matter of action by the board of directors.
59
  Indeed, the 
same is true even if the corporation is made whole, which may explain why 
the Delaware courts have been so hostile to individual recovery. 
Finally, as I argue above and further below, buyers need no remedy if 
they are diversified.  With respect to undiversified investors, if they are left 
in the same position as if there had been no fraud, it is difficult to see why 
they should recover because of the bad luck of buying a stock that was 
about to fall. 
 
 57. Again, average annual turnover for Vanguard index funds is about 14%.  And 
(coincidentally) index funds account for about 14% of all equity mutual funds (by aggregate 
value).  INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 33. 
 58. See Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 407 F.3d 381, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
the misrepresentations at issue harmed the corporation as a whole, and thus a direct suit was 
not the proper avenue for relief); Shirvanian v. DeFrates, 161 S.W.3d 102, 110 (Tex. App. 
2004) (finding that misrepresentations at issue constituted misuse of corporate assets and 
thus the proper claim is derivative); see also Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 414 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (“Requiring derivative enforcement of claims belonging in the first instance to the 
corporation also prevents an individual shareholder from incurring a benefit at the expense 
of other shareholders similarly situated.”). 
 59. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that self-
dealing occurs when a parent corporation causes subsidiary to act in some way that benefits 
the parent, and disadvantages the minority shareholders).  But see James J. Park, 
Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 324–27 (2009) (arguing 
that payment to some shareholders while excluding others can be warranted). 
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Needless to say, an undiversified investor will likely object to the 
approach described above.  To be sure, an investor who favors a class 
action might not be opposed in principle to a derivative action as long as 
his total recovery is equal to what he would recover under a class action—
as long as the total of his individual recovery together with the increase in 
the value of his stock is equal to the total recovery he would have enjoyed 
with a class action alone.  But given the very real possibility that buyers 
might not get paid at all if the corporation must first recover in full, it 
seems likely that many buyers would prefer to have their representative 
plaintiff seek the maximum possible class recovery even if there is some 
chance that everyone could be made whole by derivative recovery.  In other 
words, an undiversified investor would presumably favor the first scenario 
in which aggregate damages are maximized.
60
 
There is another possibly more important reason why some 
investors—or their lawyers—might favor a class action over a derivative 
action:  Since damages are maximized in a class action, class action 
lawyers can command bigger fees than derivative action lawyers.  This 
may also explain why, in practice, class actions tend to be emphasized and 
derivative actions are typically settled with nonmonetary governance 
reforms, as well as why derivative lawyers might go along with the 
arrangement.  In short, it may be that a share of the fee from a class action 
is more than the fee would be from derivative action—and enough more 
that the derivative lawyer does better from a financial standpoint by playing 
second fiddle rather than lead guitar.  To be sure, a derivative action is a 
risky undertaking in that the corporation may take over control of the 
litigation.  Still, it is not unfair to suggest that class action lawyers 




 60. It may also be a subtle advantage that the class action depletes the insurance pot and 
leaves nothing for derivative recovery.  Again, if the corporation gets a monetary recovery, 
it should reduce the class recovery. 
 61. This story is consistent with recent controversies about law firms paying buyers to 
serve as class action plaintiffs (which led to the indictment of William Lerach, Melvyn 
Weiss, and others). See Richard A. Booth, Why Pay a Fraud Plaintiff to Sue?, WASH. POST, 
June 26, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/25/AR 
2006062500527.html (arguing that often times plaintiffs are paid to join the class action 
because otherwise they have nothing to gain).  Indeed, this practice suggests that many 
individual investors may in fact be neutral about class actions.  To be fair, it can be quite 
time-consuming to serve as a representative plaintiff.  And indeed PSLRA permits 
representative plaintiffs to be compensated for expenses including lost wages.  On the other 
hand, if a law firm must retain an individual investor to have a client at the ready when 
fraud happens, the investor must be quite well diversified.  This suggests that the typical 
representative plaintiff is not likely to be a good representative for the undiversified 
investors who should most favor class actions.  The flap over paid plaintiffs has arguably led 
to another dubious practice.  Although PSLRA requires that the class member with the 
largest claim be named the representative plaintiff (assuming he wants the job), the position 
goes to public and union pension plans in an unusually large proportion of cases.  See 2009 
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Yet another practical factor that may favor class actions over 
derivative actions is insurance.  Again, buyer claims are typically paid by 
insurance.  Although director and officer (D&O) policies may cover some 
derivative claims, it would be odd for the insurance company to pay buyers 
to settle the class claim against the corporation and then to pay the 
corporation to settle its derivative claim against the individual wrongdoers.  
At the very least, the insurance company might seek to net the corporate 
recovery against the buyer recovery.  Indeed, it is somewhat odd for the 
insurance company to pay the corporation at all: If the corporation that 
bought the insurance also stands to recover thereunder, presumably the 
corporation will argue for the biggest claim possible. 
The obvious solution is to divorce D&O coverage from the 
corporation’s general liability coverage.  (Incidentally, this would also 
address the insurance depletion problem discussed above.) Indeed, it is 
arguable that directors and officers should pay for their own insurance. At 
the very least, D&O insurance should be obtained from a separate carrier 
and should be treated as a compensation expense. 
Finally, yet another factor that discourages derivative actions in 
practice is that defendant corporations may prefer class actions.  A 
derivative action effectively pits a corporation against its own directors and 
officers, both of whom must be separately represented by their own 
attorneys.  In contrast, in a class action the defendant corporation typically 
runs the defense even though the insurance company presumably could 
assume control if it insisted on doing so.  In a class action, the corporation 
and its directors and officers can circle the wagons and present a unified 
defense.  They may even be able to avoid addressing some questions about 
the potential liability of individual wrongdoers on the theory that it is 
irrelevant to assign individual blame if the corporation pays anyway.
62
 
The bottom line is that securities litigation is riddled with market 
failures that effectively prevent the parties from reaching the most efficient 
outcome possible. 
 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, supra note 36, at 11 (finding that derivative actions tend to have 
public pension plans serving as lead plaintiffs).  One possible explanation for the activity of 
public pension plans is that law firms can effectively compensate such plaintiffs by making 
contributions to the campaigns of the officials who can influence fund decisions.  Similar 
motivations may explain the activity of union pension plans.  But unions may also be 
motivated by the possibility of influence over employment practices.  It should be noted that 
institutions serve as lead plaintiffs in about 65% of cases.  And when a pension plan serves 
as a lead plaintiff, settlements tend to be higher.  Such cases are also more likely to be 
accompanied by a derivative action.  Id. at 10–11. 
 62. On the other hand, PSLRA requires that the jury or the court determine the 
proportionate liability of anyone claimed to have caused or contributed to the loss incurred 
by the plaintiff apparently irrespective of whether any such person is a defendant in the 
action.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (2010) (providing for the proportionate liability scheme). 
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To be sure one might object to the foregoing analysis as contrary to 
private ordering:  Why should we prevent the parties from settling on any 
terms to which they can agree?  So it seems a bit artificial to focus in such 
detail on who pays whom in what order.  Moreover, since the settlement is 
almost always paid wholly by insurance, who is to say that practice is not 
consistent with the investor interests anyway?  Presumably, we can trust 
the parties to work out an agreement that is as fair as it can be.  In other 
words, the objection is that the law may be wrong, but in practice it does 
not matter. (While the French might object that it is not good enough for a 
solution to work in practice if it does not also work in theory, the common 
law tradition tends to ignore such niceties.) 
The answer is that the parties are not in fact free to settle however they 
might agree.  Whether the action is litigated as a class action or a derivative 
action, the court must approve any settlement.  In practice, this means that 
the merits of the case are effectively litigated in the context of the court’s 
potential approval of the settlement.
63
  Thus, the court must decide whether 
the settlement is fair and in doing so must consider the strength of the 
claims of the various parties.  The obvious rationale for this rule is that 
these are representative actions and the rights of absent parties hang in the 
balance.  Accordingly, the courts have—and should exercise—broad 
discretion in the management of securities litigation.
64
 
B.  Restitution 
There is another potential source of derivative recovery.  If directors, 
officers, or other agents of the defendant company engage in insider trading 
or other forms of misappropriation so as to profit from the bad news that 
 
 63. For a good example, see In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235, 254–
55 (D.N.J. 2000) (discussing settlement of class claims and objections of derivative 
plaintiffs thereto); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235, 246–54 (D.N.J. 
2000) (discussing derivative claims in detail and suggesting that corporation might be able 
to recover from its officers and agents as a result of losses suffered from an improvident 
settlement of a securities fraud class action).  See also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 
201, 217–21 (3d Cir. 2001) (reviewing settlement as a whole).  The Cendant case is 
somewhat complicated by the fact that it included claims under the 1933 Act. 
 64. One might object that the foregoing analysis assumes first that everyone involved 
recovers 100% of the loss suffered (in concluding that the third scenario is optimal) and then 
assumes that it is unlikely that 100% of claims will be satisfied (in concluding that corporate 
claims should be paid first).  There is no genuine contradiction here.  It is important to 
consider how the law would work under ideal circumstances in thinking about what the 
rules should be.  Even though securities fraud class actions almost always settle for 
something less than 100% of the claim, it is important to get the rules right since the rules 
determine the strength of the claim.  In other words, it does not matter that cases are never 
litigated all the way to a resolution.  We still need to get the rules right so that the parties 
will be able to negotiate with each other having some sense of who would win what or lose 
what if an agreement cannot be reached.  See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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triggers the securities litigation, the company may have a claim for 
restitution in addition to the other claims discussed above.
65
  It is not clear 
that such insider gains contribute much (if anything) to investor losses 
(although it is possible that insider selling may effectively increase public 
float and cause some slight additional downward pressure on share price).
66
  
On the other hand, insider trading may be a factor in any reputational harm.  
And indeed, insider trading has been cited by the courts as evidence of 
scienter.
67
  In any event, under well-established principles of agency law 
insider gains can clearly be recovered by the company as secret profits.
68
  
This claim is clearly one that belongs to the defendant company because 
 
 65. See Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 704–08 (Del. Ch. 2010), abrogated by Kahn v. 
Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P., 23 A.3d 831, 836–40 (Del. 2011); Brophy v. Cities 
Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7–8 (Del. Ch. 1949) (recognizing the right of a Delaware corporation 
to recover from its fiduciaries for harm caused by insider trading). See also United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) (stating that a fiduciary who engages in insider trading 
defrauds principal in connection with the purchase or sale of securities by misappropriating 
principal’s information for personal gain); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 15–16 
(2d Cir. 1983) (deciding that a counterparty to insider trade has no claim where violation is 
based on duty that runs to principal whose information was misappropriated).  See generally 
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 5.04 (1994) (providing a statutory basis for the 
rule that executives or board members cannot improperly use corporate property for their 
own benefit).  Ironically, there is some doubt about whether state law claims for 
disgorgement continue to survive in the face of sweeping federal law that arguably occupies 
the field of insider trading (or indeed whether there ever was any claim for disgorgement 
under Delaware corporation law).  But there seems to be no question that insider trading 
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty and that consequential damages may be recovered.  
See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904, 928 n.111 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(“Notably, the abolition of Brophy would not preclude a recovery by the corporation for 
actual harm to itself caused by illicit insider trading by a fiduciary, but the existence and 
extent of such damage would have to be proven.”); see also Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 
186, 192 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that under Indiana law a derivative suit may not be 
maintained against corporate officers and directors to recover profits for alleged illegal 
trading of corporate stock on basis of material inside information); In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 
654 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that a derivative claim by a harmed 
corporation against officers on basis of insider trading stated cause of action under New 
Jersey law); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975) (holding that corporation 
may recover only if it suffered harm from insider trading).  But see Diamond v. Oreamuno, 
248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that allegation of damage to corporation is not 
essential element of a derivative suit against a director for insider trading).  See generally 
Douglas M. Branson, Choosing the Appropriate Default Rule—Insider Trading Under State 
Law, 45 ALA. L. REV. 753, 765–71 (1994) (arguing that under state law, liability for trading 
on inside information is significantly assigned). 
 66. Although there may be some slight further decrease in price that is attributable to 
insider gain, it is not clear that it is worthwhile to pursue it since the company is clearly 
entitled to recover the gain from the recipients on a theory of unjust enrichment. 
 67. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that by 
trading on prohibited information, a culpable state of mind can be imputed to the offender). 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.02, 8.05 (2006) (providing a statutory 
basis for the forfeiture of improperly derived gains by an agent). 
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the duty is one that runs to the company.  In other words, it is a derivative 
claim.  Although this claim is likely to be relatively small compared to the 
total loss suffered by buyers and holders, it may nonetheless add some 
marginal amount to the potential derivative recovery so as to further reduce 
buyer claims.  Thus, it provides an additional reason for a derivative action. 
One possible problem with this claim is that federal law also provides 
for a direct claim by contemporaneous traders who would presumably also 
be members of any plaintiff class arising from the same set of events.
69
  
This may also create a conflict within the plaintiff class—albeit a 
manageable one—between class members who should recover investment 
losses only and class members who should recover investment losses plus 
contemporaneous trading losses.  But there is nothing in federal law to 
suggest that the cause of action for contemporaneous trading preempts the 
established state law claim that belongs to the company.
70
  Indeed, federal 
law expressly recognizes the claims of the corporation.  First, although 
class claims for securities fraud must be litigated in federal court under the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), SLUSA expressly 
preserves state court jurisdiction over derivative actions in a provision 
popularly known as the Delaware carve-out.
71
  Second, federal courts look 
to state law to determine whether there is any duty to disclose or abstain 
from trading under Rule 10b-5.
72
  Finally, the Securities Exchange Act 
 
 69. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2006) (explaining 
the details of the liability that may be attached to traders who engage in insider trading). 
 70. See LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 137–42 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that 
preempted claims under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act did not prevent 
claims under Swiss law); Pfeiffer, 989 A.2d at 708 (denying the corporation’s motion to 
dismiss shareholder’s claim because the shareholder adequately pled demand futility and 
stated a claim for breach of duty of loyalty).  If anything, it is the federal claim for 
contemporaneous trading that seems peculiar. 
 71. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2006).  There are 
actually two (or three) such carve-outs in the section.  One preserves actions relating to the 
purchase or sale of stock by the issuer and actions relating to stockholder voting and similar 
decisions (even though these actions may involve allegations of nondisclosure).  The other 
carve-out preserves an exclusively derivative action brought by one or more stockholders on 
behalf of a corporation.  It is the latter that is the focus here.  It is somewhat troubling that 
this provision relates to an exclusively derivative action in that this modifier might suggest 
that a derivative action involving the possibility of individual recovery might not be 
exempted.  On the other hand, such an action could always be tried in federal court. 
 72. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665–66 (1997) (holding that the 
misappropriation theory could be applied to secure liability under the Securities Exchange 
Act based on state law); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (showing that the Supreme 
Court based its holding on relevant state law to conclude that that petitioner did not owe a 
duty to abstain from insider trading); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–80 
(1977) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court applied Delaware law in analyzing the 
shareholder’s cause of action).  Indeed, the SEC has established a procedure by which it 
may refer substantive questions of corporation law to state court.  See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. 
AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231–40 (Del. 2008) (outlining the SEC 
BOOTH_FINALIZEDTHREE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012  11:24 AM 
736 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
provides that in cases of short-swing trading—presumptive insider 
trading—by a director or officer or major stockholder, the issuer 
corporation may recover any profit or loss avoided.  Indeed, the statute 
expressly provides that if the corporation fails to seek recovery, a 
stockholder may file a derivative action (although the action must be filed 
in federal court because of exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims arising 
under the 1934 Act).
73
 
While there can be little doubt that federal law preserves the state law 
claims of the corporation outlined here, the implication is that individual 
defendants could be sued for the same claim twice.
74
  That may not be a 
problem in principle since federal law provides for a treble-the-gain fine for 
insider trading anyway.
75
  So why not four times the gain? Nevertheless, 
 
procedure for solving issues based on corporate law in Delaware where the defendant 
corporation was incorporated).  In addition, the SEC has been known to file amicus briefs in 
state court in cases in which the effect of its rules may depend on state law.  See Moran v. 
Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1078 (Del. Ch. 1985) (noting that the SEC submitted 
a Report of Recommendations in a prior case where state law was at issue). 
 73. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (noting that any 
profit from the purchase and sale of security should be recoverable by the issuer within six 
months).  It is also conceivable that the corporation may have a claim under Rule 10b-5 on 
the theory that the fraud caused a loss in the value of the corporation.  See Goldberg v. 
Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218–19 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the plaintiff adequately stated a 
claim for loss of value due to misleading press releases). 
 74. See Pfeiffer, 989 A.2d at 708 (demonstrating that the court allowed the defendant to 
be sued for breach of duty of loyalty). 
 75. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A, 15 U.S.C. 78u-1 (2006) (explaining 
civil penalties imposed for insider trading).  The treble-the-gain fine (TGF) was added first 
by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) (as featured—and misnamed—in the 
movie Wall Street) and was later beefed up by the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA).  Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2006)); Insider Trading 
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988), 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006)).  ITSFEA expanded the TGF to provide for the 
possibility of assessment against controlling persons who failed to institute adequate 
safeguards designed to prevent insider trading by officers, employees, and other controlled 
persons.  ITSFEA also provided for the claim by contemporaneous traders but only to the 
extent of the gain (or loss avoided) by those engaging in insider trading.  The TGF is 
retained by the SEC.  ITSA and ITSFEA were designed to address the problem that mere 
disgorgement is no real disincentive for insider trading.  If the only consequence is that one 
must give back the gain, there is no reason not to engage in insider trading (if one ignores 
the costs of defense and possible jail time).  Moreover, there is little incentive for 
counterparties to sue if they can recover only a minute percentage of their loss.  But if 
everyone who trades at the same time as insiders can recover their losses, the potential 
liability for insider trading would be massive.  For good discussions of this problem, see 
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318–23 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that based on current 
law, plaintiffs could not collect damages for losses caused by the insider third-party trading 
of the defendants) and Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 
228, 230–31 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that plaintiffs could collect damages for their losses 
due to the defendants’ acts of insider trading).  Overdeterrence can be as bad as 
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the prospect of individual wrongdoers being sued twice for the same wrong 
is likely to give rise to conflicts between the class action and the derivative 
action.  Presumably, the class representative will argue that the claim 
should belong to the class, and the derivative representative will argue that 
the claim should belong to the company.  Indeed, class members who did 
not happen to trade contemporaneously with insiders may also favor 
treating these claims as derivative since they will benefit somewhat from 
any derivative recovery while any direct recovery will likely go to those 





underdeterrence since the threat of massive liability may discourage legitimate trading 
activity that keeps the market efficient.  Needless to say, a standalone claim for 
contemporaneous trading holds little value for investors.  In many cases, the gains from 
insider trading may not be enough even to motivate a class action lawyer to sue.  And in 
most cases, the large number of investors who happen to buy at about the same time that 
insiders sell will so dilute the recovery of individual buyers that many would likely not even 
bother to claim their share of a settlement.  Thus, it is not surprising that there are very few 
reported cases involving a claim for contemporaneous trading.  In contrast, it seems much 
more sensible for the company to recover the ill-gotten gains of insiders in one lump sum 
than for individual investors to pursue pennies apiece for contemporaneous trading.  On the 
other hand, one might argue that a direct claim for contemporaneous trading may be 
justified as a way of encouraging claims against individual wrongdoers since the damages in 
securities fraud class actions are usually paid wholly by the company (or the company’s 
insurer).  Still, it is somewhat troubling that ITSFEA provides that the corporation may be 
held liable for the insider trading of its agents in some circumstances since the essence of 
the argument here is that the claim is one that rightfully belongs to the corporation.  
Moreover, as noted above, federal law provides that the corporation recovers for short-
swing trading—what one might call per se insider trading.  See Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006) (requiring statutory insiders to disgorge profits 
from purchasing and selling company securities within a six-month period).  In short, 
federal law relating to insider trading is hopelessly confused. 
  In addition to the above rationale, the claim for contemporaneous trading addresses 
the problem illustrated by Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231–35 (1980) (holding 
that the corporation’s employee did not owe shareholders a duty to disclose inside 
knowledge), and Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 14–15 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding 
that the shareholder failed to state a claim because he could not show that any of the 
defendants owed him a duty of disclosure), that the counterparty to an insider trade has no 
claim where the violation is based solely on a duty that runs to principal whose information 
was misappropriated.  In other words, counterparties have no claim in circumstances in 
which third parties who have access to inside information derived from outside the company 
(such as information about a pending tender offer) use that information to trade in the stock 
of the target company.  The claim for contemporaneous trading was largely born of 
Congressional frustration at its inability to come up with a definition for insider trading.  In 
other words, the provision smacks of the need to do something for the sake of appearance.  
So Congress threw a bone to investors.  Regrettably, it caused even more confusion in that it 
reinforced the misguided notion implicit in class actions that the way to address securities 
fraud is to provide for direct individual investor recovery. 
 76. It is worth asking how the law relating to securities fraud evolved into such a 
confused state.  The answer is really quite simple.  Under the 1933 Act, an investor who 
buys newly issued stock in a fraudulent offering is entitled to damages or rescission as 
BOOTH_FINALIZEDTHREE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012  11:24 AM 
738 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
 
against the issuer.  Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5, 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77E (2006).  But the remedy 
is limited to investors who buy newly issued stock in which the company itself is (usually) 
the seller.  In effect, the remedy is one of disgorgement.  If the company is already publicly 
traded and makes an offering of additional stock, the remedy extends only to the newly 
issued stock.  The buyer must be able to trace the stock he bought to the offering in order to 
have a remedy.  See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 45 n.1 (2d Cir. 
2006) (explaining that a plaintiff must show that its shares were a part of the offering in 
question marred by a defective registration statement).  The problem is that an investor who 
buys on the secondary market may not be able to prove that his stock was part of the 
offering even though he may be able to show that he read and relied on the prospectus 
issued by the company.  It seems unfair to deny a remedy to such an investor.  Thus, the 
courts permitted such investors to recover under Rule 10b-5 if they were able to show the 
additional elements required thereunder.  In other words, actions under Rule 10b-5 may 
have been seen largely as supplementary to actions under the 1933 Act under which only 
those who can trace their shares to a public offering have a remedy.  Under Rule 10b-5, 
investors who bought already outstanding shares could also sue.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2012).   (Never mind that the company might thereby pay out more than it raised in the 
offering).  It was a small step from using Rule 10b-5 to supplement claims under the 1933 
Act to permit investors to sue even in the absence of an offering if the company made some 
sort of false statement that affected market price.  Moreover, when securities fraud class 
actions first developed in the 1960s, most stock was held by poorly diversified individual 
investors.  Arguably, such investors needed the protections afforded by securities fraud class 
actions. 
  This is not to suggest that there is a problem with the 1933 Act.  To the contrary, it 
makes perfect sense for investors who buy newly issued stock from the company itself to 
recover from the company in cases of fraud.  In effect, the 1933 Act provides for 
disgorgement by issuers in cases in which they have effectively misappropriated capital 
from the market by false pretenses.  Although the recovery reduces the aggregate value of 
the company, it does not give rise to feedback in the same way as an action under Rule 10b-
5 because recovery is limited to the proceeds of the offering.  It merely returns the company 
to its financial status before the offering.  But that does not mean that securities fraud class 
actions make sense and that the company should pay whether or not it benefits from the 
supposed fraud.  Moreover, the 1933 Act makes sense even in a world of efficient markets 
and diversified investors.  As the courts have noted, there is no efficient market in IPOs.  
But the 1933 Act is not premised on an efficient market.  It is aimed at companies who gain 
access to the capital markets by fraud.  To be clear, the ultimate problem with recognizing 
any direct action by buyers against the company is that the company pays.  No one has 
suggested that we should require sellers to give back their gains.  Thus, it is not clear that 
there should be any such remedy against the company.  Again, the Supreme Court has never 
expressly approved the measure of damages nor indeed the idea that federal law implies that 
the company should pay in the absence of an offering.  On the other hand, federal law has 
provided from the beginning that the corporation may recover short-swing gains from 
officers, directors, and major stockholders.  In other words, the approach advocated here is 
wholly consistent with the general scheme of federal securities law, which seems to focus 
on a rescission and restitution as the primary remedies. 
  It is really quite extraordinary that Congress has legislated as much as it has in this 
area—which is not to mention the extraordinary number of Rule 10b-5 cases that have been 
decided by the Supreme Court.  It is even more extraordinary that Congress has gone so far 
as to alter the rules of civil procedure just to deal with the litigation tactics that have evolved 
in connection with the particular subject matter of securities fraud.  It may be that the large 
sums of money involved have attracted undue attention from the plaintiff bar.  But it seems 
more likely that there is something about the law of securities fraud that is out of kilter.  See 
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To summarize this part of the argument, there is a fundamental 
conflict between the interests of diversified investors and the interests of 
undiversified investors.  Undiversified investors are likely to favor class 
actions.  Diversified investors are likely to oppose class actions and to 
favor derivative actions.  Although undiversified investors would not object 
to a derivative action in principle, they might object because the derivative 
recovery would reduce the class recovery.  In other words, each group 
opposes what the other favors.  Investors who stand to gain more from a 
class action will want their representative plaintiff (and lawyer) to 
maximize their claim by downplaying or indeed ignoring any evidence of 
derivative claims.  The remainder of investors will want a zealous 
derivative plaintiff (and lawyer) to maximize derivative claims. 
III. CLASS ACTION REQUIREMENTS 
Under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) a 
class action may be maintained only if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.
77
 
In addition, Rule 23(b)(3), which governs actions for damages, requires 
that: 
[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of 
the controversy.  The matters pertinent to the findings include: 
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and 
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun 
by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
 
Richard A. Booth, The Missing Link Between Insider Trading and Securities Fraud, 2 J. 
BUS. TECH. L. 185, 195–98 (2007) (arguing that federal securities law does not adequately 
cover many ways that insider trading can be conducted). 
 77. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). 
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Rule 23(c) requires that an action must be certified as a class action at 
an early practicable time.
79
  That is, the trial court must determine that the 
action is an appropriate one to be handled as a class action.  If not, the 
action reverts to an individual action on behalf of the named plaintiffs. 
Finally, Rule 23(d) provides that in the conduct of a class action, “the 
court may issue orders that:  (A) determine the course of proceedings or 
prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in 
presenting evidence or argument.”
80
 
Rule 23 presupposes that the court will determine whether the claims 
are direct or derivative, and thus whether the Rule applies at all.  In other 
words, the question whether a claim is properly characterized as a direct 
class claim, a derivative claim, or some combination thereof comes before 
any question about whether an action may be maintained as a class action 
under Rule 23.  That the court must answer that question is implicit in the 
certification requirement of Rule 23(c).  There is no doubt that the court 
has the power to decide whether an action is direct or derivative.  The fact 
that the parties have characterized the action as direct does not make it so.
81
 
Moreover, if the court decides that the claims asserted include both 
direct and derivative claims, it is also implicit in Rule 23 that it is up to the 
court to determine the order in which the claims will be resolved.
82
 
As noted above, there are compelling reasons why derivative claims 
should be decided first.  A derivative recovery will reduce any direct 
recovery, whereas recovery directly against the company will increase a 
derivative recovery.  Thus, it is impossible to know the correct amount of a 
direct claim until the derivative claim has been determined. 
Assuming (for the sake of argument) that the court determines that 
there are direct claims that may be litigated in a class action, the court must 
then determine that class action status is appropriate.  In practice, the courts 
 
 78. Id. at 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 23(c). 
 80. Id. at 23(d)(1)(A). 
 81. See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 
713 (1974) (holding that an entity who purchased 98.3% of stock from a corporation and 
alleging no fraud has no standing in equity to maintain this action for alleged corporate 
mismanagement); and Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 
(Del. 2004) (holding that plaintiffs lost their standing to bring action when they tendered 
their shares in connection with a merger).  Indeed, where a claim may be pursued as a 
derivative action, it should be pursued as a derivative action.  See supra note 54 and 
accompanying text. 
 82. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3)(D) states that the court must consider 
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.  FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3)(d).  Moreover, Rule 23(d) provides that the court has the power to issue such 
orders as are necessary to manage the action. 
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have not strictly applied the requirements of Rule 23.  But, the Second 
Circuit recently ruled that a trial court must determine that all of the 
requirements for a class action have been met in order to certify the class.
83
  
It is not enough for the trial court to find that there has been some showing 
that the action satisfies the standards set forth in Rule 23.  Rather, the court 
must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the action satisfies the 
requirements of Rule 23.
84
  As the Second Circuit stated: 
A district judge is to assess all of the relevant evidence admitted 
at the class certification stage and determine whether each Rule 
23 requirement has been met, just as the judge would resolve a 
dispute about any other threshold prerequisite for continuing a 
lawsuit.  Finally, we decline to follow the dictum in Heerwagen 
suggesting that a district judge may not weigh conflicting 
evidence and determine the existence of a Rule 23 requirement 




In other words, courts must take seriously the requirements of Rule 23 in 
deciding whether an action may proceed as a class action.
86
   
 Few securities fraud actions are likely to pass muster. The conflict of 
interests between diversified investors and undiversified investors and 
among various diversified investors who follow various trading strategies 
poses a serious problem for class action certification.  Indeed, the conflict 
is so fundamental (and unmanageable) that the courts should decline to 
certify securities fraud class actions that seek damages on behalf of 
individual investors.  First, given that there will always be a substantial 
number of class members opposed to certification, it is simply impossible 
for anyone to qualify as an adequate class representative.  Second, the 
differing interests of diversified and undiversified investors give rise to 
individual questions of fact—reliance in particular—that predominate over 
common questions.  Third, since part of the claim in any meritorious class 
action is likely to be derivative, a derivative action is clearly superior to a 
class action. 
 
 83. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig. 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 84. Id. at 42.  See also Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 
261, 264 (5th Cir. 2007) (“The class certification determination rests within the sound 
determination of the trial court . . . .”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First 
Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing a class certification 
due to lack of classwide reliance on misleading information). 
 85. In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 42. 
 86. Id. 
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A.  Adequate Representation 
One of the four requirements that must be met in all class actions is 
that the named plaintiff(s) will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class.
87
  Given their fundamentally conflicting interests, it is impossible 
for an undiversified stock-picking investor adequately to represent a 
diversified portfolio-balancing investor.
88
  A diversified portfolio-balancing 
investor would not likely ever file a class action in the first place, but he 
might well file a derivative action.  On the other hand, an undiversified 
stock-picking investor would be quick to file a class action and probably 
would oppose a derivative action if it were to take precedence over the 
class action.
89
  These conflicts are doubly troubling because the derivative 
action is in effect a class action on behalf of all stockholders, whereas the 
class action is an action on behalf of buyers only.  Some of the stockholders 
and buyers would object to certification of the class action but favor the 
prosecution of the derivative action. 
The law is clear that no one can represent both of these groups.  The 
courts have recognized that one individual cannot serve as the 
representative plaintiff in both a direct class action and a derivative action 
because the plaintiff’s interest in maximizing his individual recovery is 
likely to conflict with his interest in maximizing the derivative recovery 
that goes to the company.
90
  Thus, the conflict between diversified and 
 
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 88. As discussed above, there are a variety of investor types that may fall between these 
two extremes, and it may be difficult to draw the line between those who benefit from a 
class action and those for whom the class action is a net detriment.  Still, for present 
purposes it is enough to consider these two polar types of investors as likely to be in any 
plaintiff class.  Thus, the discussion here focuses on the conflicting interests of these two 
archetypes and does not explore in any detail the conflicts that might arise between other 
possible investor types. 
 89. See FED. RULE. CIV. P. 23.1, which governs derivative actions. It also requires that 
the named plaintiff also be found to be an adequate representative of the corporation. 
 90. See Zarowitz v. BankAmerica Corp., 866 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1989) (wherein 
plaintiff could not serve as derivative plaintiff where his interest in increasing the value of 
his stock “through a larger derivative suit recovery [was] dwarfed by his interest in pursuing 
his litigation with the Bank”); Owen v. Modern Diversified Indus., Inc., 643 F.2d 441, 443 
(6th Cir. 1981) (wherein plaintiff could not serve as derivative plaintiff where there was “a 
strong possibility that [the] derivative action would be used merely as a device to obtain 
leverage” in plaintiff’s individual suit); Davis v. Comed, Inc., 619 F.2d 588, 593–94 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (considering the plaintiff’s relationship and familiarity with the class litigation); 
Ryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 133, 136–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a 
minority shareholder who sought to bring derivative suit on behalf of corporation and, 
simultaneously, class action against corporation and other defendants was subject to conflict 
of interest which rendered him unable to fairly and adequately represent interest of 
shareholders); Kamerman v. Steinberg, 113 F.R.D. 511, 515–16 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (class 
certification denied where plaintiffs also brought derivative claims); Horowitz v. Pownall, 
582 F. Supp. 665, 666 (D. Md. 1984) (finding conflict where “the proposed class and 
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undiversified investors is fundamentally different from the somewhat 
worrisome possibility that a representative plaintiff might seek to shift 
around the damages within the class period.
91
  Rather, the conflict is 
between an investor class that would want the action to go forward and an 
investor class that would prefer to see it dismissed or converted into a 
derivative action. 
The Supreme Court long ago ruled unequivocally that a representative 
plaintiff who has an interest in asserting a claim cannot represent a party 
whose interests may be opposed to those of the representative plaintiff.  In 
Hansberry v. Lee,
92
 the plaintiff sought an injunction seeking to prohibit 
 
plaintiff would be in direct competition with each other for the damages that the directors 
and officers would be required to pay in compensation for their illegal actions”); Petersen v. 
Federated Dev. Co., 416 F. Supp. 466, 475 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (assumption that plaintiff 
bringing individual and derivative claims cannot fairly represent shareholders); Caan v. 
Kane-Miller Corp., No. 71 Civ. 878 (WCC), 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13019, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974) (individual and derivative actions may not be maintained simultaneously); Ruggiero 
v. American Bioculture, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 93, 94–95 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that class and 
derivative actions may not be pursued simultaneously).  See also In re Pacific Enters. Sec. 
Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995) (expressing concern in connection with approval of 
settlement about Milberg Weiss law firm’s dual representation of class and derivative 
plaintiffs). But see Mayer v. Dev. Corp. of America, 396 F. Supp. 917, 930–31 (D. Del. 
1975) (individual action against corporation is not absolute bar to derivative action). 
Delaware courts have had little trouble with this conflict in actions arising under state 
corporation law.  Compare Colonial Sec. Corp. v. Allen, C.A. No. 6778, 1983 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 393, at *12–13 (Del. Ch. 1983), and Youngman v. Tahmoush, 457 A.2d 376, 380 
(Del. Ch. 1983) (“The fact that the plaintiff may have interests which go beyond the 
interests of the class, but are at least co-extensive with the class interest, will not defeat his 
serving as a representative of the class.”) with Scopas Tech. Co. v. Lord, No. 7559, 1984 
WL 8266, at *6–7 (interest in his personal claims outweighed his interest in pursuing the 
derivative action with the same vigor as the personal claims). 
 91. Traditionally, the courts have been unreceptive to the argument that a representative 
plaintiff might seek to undermine the claims of some class members. See Freeland v. 
Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 233 F.R.D. 40, 48 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that plaintiff 
who sold his stock before the end of class period did not disqualify him as class 
representative), citing In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (holding that conflict of interest did not represent a valid reason for refusing to certify 
a class); see also In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., No. 1:98cv2465 (ESH), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27875 (D.D.C. 2002); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 369, 377–78 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that potential conflicts in the proposed class were not fatal to 
certification).  But see In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (N.D. Cal. 
1994) (finding that the representative plaintiff had divergent interests from the plaintiff 
class).  In most cases, it is difficult to see how one subgroup would gain from a loss by 
another subgroup.  At worst, the representative plaintiff might seek to emphasize the losses 
suffered during a particular part of the class period, increasing damages for some investors 
and decreasing damages for others depending on when they bought the subject stock.  
However, plaintiff lawyers will seek to maximize aggregate damages.  Therefore, the 
problem largely takes care of itself.  The conflict between diversified and undiversified 
investors is different. 
 92. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
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defendants from owning and occupying real property in violation of a 
restrictive covenant.  The covenant had been upheld as valid in a previous 
decision by the Illinois Supreme Court in an action brought by similarly 
situated landowners who sought to enforce it.  In Hansberry, the Illinois 
Supreme Court ruled that its previous decision was a “class” or 
“representative” action that had determined the rights of other members of 
the class—similarly situated landowners—and was thus res judicata in the 
later action.  The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
Illinois court on due process grounds, ruling that plaintiffs who sought to 
enforce the covenant could not be said to have represented the interests of 
parties who sought to challenge the covenant.  As the Court stated: 
Those who sought to secure [the benefits of the covenant] by 
enforcing it could not be said to be in the same class with or 
represent those whose interest was in resisting performance . . . .  
If those who thus seek to secure the benefits of the agreement 
were rightly regarded by the state Supreme Court as constituting 
a class, it is evident that those signers or their successors who are 
interested in challenging the validity of the agreement and 
resisting its performance are not of the same class in the sense 
that their interests are identical so that any group who had elected 
to enforce rights conferred by the agreement could be said to be 
acting in the interest of any others who were free to deny its 
obligation. 
Because of the dual and potentially conflicting interests of 
those who are putative parties to the agreement in compelling or 
resisting its performance, it is impossible to say, solely because 
they are parties to it, that any two of them are of the same class.  
Nor without more, and with the due regard for the protection of 
the rights of absent parties which due process exacts, can some 
be permitted to stand in judgment for all. 
It is one thing to say that some members of a class may 
represent other members in a litigation where the sole and 
common interest of the class in the litigation, is either to assert a 
common right or to challenge an asserted obligation.  It is quite 
another to hold that all those who are free alternatively either to 
assert rights or to challenge them are of a single class, so that any 
group, merely because it is of the class so constituted, may be 
deemed adequately to represent any others of the class in 
litigating their interests in either alternative.  Such a selection of 
representatives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial 
interests are not necessarily or even probably the same as those 
whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford that 
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protection to absent parties which due process requires.
93
 
It follows that where some members of the class would be opposed to the 
class action, the action cannot be certified as a class action.
94
 
In response, a named plaintiff might argue that he seeks only to 
represent the interests of buyers.  In other words, he might argue that he 
seeks only to serve the interests of buyer-holders as buyers and that he does 
not seek to represent them as holders.  Moreover, he might further argue 
that while holders might object to the class action and favor a derivative 
action, they have no standing to sue.  Or the named plaintiff might try to 
define the class as one comprising only buyers who bought enough of a 
fraud-affected stock that they would recover more from the class action 
than they would lose as holders.  Indeed, the plaintiff might seek to exclude 
all buyer-holders simply for the sake of simplicity.
95
 
To argue that the named plaintiff seeks only to represent investors 
who favor the class action is for the procedural tail to wage the substantive 
dog.  At some point, efforts to gerrymander the definition of the class must 
run into due process limits.  Rule 23 requires that the named plaintiff 
represent the interests of the plaintiff class.
96
  Indeed, the courts have held 
that a representative plaintiff is a fiduciary.
97
  It would seem to follow that 
the named plaintiff may not ignore the interests of potential class members 
by the simple expedient of excluding them from the class.  So it is difficult 
to see how a class action may satisfy the requirements of due process if the 
class is defined in such a way as to exclude class members with 
 
 93. Id. at 44–45 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 94. Admittedly, Hansberry is distinguishable in that the plaintiff essentially sought to 
represent absent parties who presumably would have argued the other side of the 
controversy.  In a securities fraud class action, those opposed to the class action do not seek 
to disprove the case of those who favor the class action.  Rather, they simply oppose the 
assertion of the class claim at all. 
 95. The named plaintiff might also argue that the objections of buyer-holders are part of 
a collusive scheme involving holders who have no standing to sue.  Thus, it might be argued 
that a court should not consider the holder-interests of buyer-holders in determining whether 
the class action should proceed.  In other words, we should consider the interests of buyer-
holders only as if they were buyers and ignoring the fact that they are also holders.  Again, it 
does no good for the plaintiff to argue that class members may vote with their feet by opting 
out of the class action.  Many buyer-holders who would object to the class action and favor 
a derivative action instead would still not opt out of the class action if it goes forward, 
because to do so would be to forfeit the compensation to which they would be entitled and 
would increase their effective loss.  If the action is successful, those who opt out effectively 
pay those who remain in the action.  But as holders they receive none of the benefit.  In the 
end, the burden is on the named plaintiff to define the class in a way that permits class 
members to be manageably ascertained. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 
24, 30 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the “implied requirement of ascertainability”).  It is not 
clear that it is possible to do so. 
 96. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 97. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 244 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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inconvenient interests.  In other words, it is arguable that representative 
plaintiffs must take their classes as they are found.  If much of a class 
would prefer not to sue, the court must respect their interests as they are 
found in the real world.
98
 
On the other hand, it may be that a class action is literally nothing 
more than a device that permits the court to deal with many cases at once.  
The possibility that some buyers may prefer not to sue—or more precisely 
prefer that others not sue—may be utterly irrelevant.  Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to believe that a court would certify a class action in which the 
named plaintiff seeks to exclude some subgroup from the class for no 
substantive reason at all.  To be sure, this would be an unusual tactic 
because a plaintiff lawyer has a strong incentive to make the class (and 
hence the fee) as large as possible. But the point is that absent class 
members have an interest in being included unless there is a good reason 
for being excluded – and particularly so in a securities fraud class action 
where the settlement will ultimately be paid out of corporate funds and will 
deplete the wealth of those who are excluded.  
Moreover, securities fraud class actions are different from other types 
of class actions.  It may not be worrisome that a potential class member in a 
products liability action (for example) might be excluded from the class 
because of some peculiarity about his claim.  Such a plaintiff can always 
bring suit individually.  More important, the fact that others are able to join 
in a class action does no harm to those who are excluded (other than 
possibly depleting the resources of the defendant).  But securities litigation 
is different because the gain of some class members comes at the expense 
of other class members who lose more from feedback than they recover.  
Although the named plaintiff might argue that such potential class 
members should be excluded from the class simply because they give rise 
to a conflict within the class, to do so is effectively to increase their losses 
by denying what minimal recovery they might enjoy. 
In the real world, the courts usually try to avoid intra-class conflicts 
by forming subclasses.  But that solution does not work in a securities fraud 
class action because it raises a multitude of individual questions about who 
belongs in what class.  Technically speaking, these are problems of 
manageability or the ability to ascertain who is in the class.  They are not 
 
 98. See Hamilton v. O’Connor Chevrolet, Inc., No. 02 C 1897, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
44149, at *50 (N.D. Ill.) (denying class certification in a suit brought by purchasers of an 
automobile where injuries would differ too greatly among members of the putative class); 
Hyderi v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 235 F.R.D. 390, 403 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding that a 
putative class representative may not define the common issue narrowly and then leave any 
non-common issues to later proceedings). 
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individual questions going to the merits.  But they are nonetheless 
individual issues that preclude certification.
99
 
To be clear, the intra-class conflicts that infect class actions arise even 
in the absence of a possible derivative action.  In a world with diversified, 
portfolio-balancing investors, there will always be a significant number of 
class members who would prefer that the action simply be dismissed even 
if it is meritorious.  No such inherent conflict infects a derivative action.  In 
a world without securities fraud class actions, no stockholder—other than a 




B.  Additional Rule 23(b)(3) Factors 
Standing alone, the problems with adequacy of representation are 
enough to deny certification.  But these are not the only problems that must 
be addressed.  Under Rule 23(b)(3) the court must find that common 
questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions and that a 





 99. See generally In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 42 (rejecting 
arguments that, in a motion for class certification, a court cannot decide on questions of fact 
which overlap with the merits in considering Rule 23’s requirements of predominance and 
superiority). 
 100. The analysis here is somewhat complicated by the peculiarities of federal securities 
law in the context of class actions.  Under PSLRA, the court must designate the lead 
plaintiff and must ordinarily designate the class member with the most at stake (if that class 
member wants the job).  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (2006).  This procedure makes it clear 
that a class action does not really belong to the plaintiff who files it and further suggests that 
the plaintiff cannot ultimately decide how the plaintiff class will be defined.  Under the 
PSLRA lead-plaintiff rule, it might be possible, for example, for an index fund to seek to be 
appointed as the representative plaintiff and then to have the action dismissed or decertified.  
It is not clear how the courts would react to a representative plaintiff who sought dismissal 
or decertification.  As a matter of procedure, a prospective representative plaintiff must seek 
the job and must presumably disclose to the court any plan to oppose certification or seek 
dismissal.  That would clearly bear on whether the prospective representative could fairly 
and adequately represent the interests of the class.  Thus, the court would effectively decide 
whether to certify the class at the same time that it appoints the representative plaintiff.  
Incidentally, the requirement that the plaintiff with the largest claim be designated as the 
representative plaintiff supports the idea that the court should manage a class action in the 
interest of the most numerous population of stockholders, namely, diversified stockholders 
and indeed portfolio-balancing, diversified stockholders, where such interests come into 
conflict with those of undiversified investors. 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  Rule 23(a) applies to all class actions and requires that the 
claims of the representative plaintiff be typical of the claims of the class members.  Rule 
23(b)(3) applies to any class action seeking individual damages on behalf of class members.  
Thus, the predominance requirement therein is in addition to the typicality requirement.  
Although most courts that have considered the question have suggested that the two 
requirements are essentially the same, it is difficult to believe that the predominance 
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1. Predominance of Common Questions 
In order to make out a claim for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, the 
plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the 
defendant, (2) scienter, (3) reliance by the plaintiff on the 
misrepresentation or omission, (4) economic loss, and (5) loss causation.
102
  
With the exception of reliance, these elements need be proven only once in 
a class action.  Before 1988, there was some doubt about the need to prove 
reliance by each individual class member in cases involving positive 
misrepresentations (as opposed to omissions).
103
  The Supreme Court 
resolved this issue in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson by adopting what has come to 
be known as the fraud-on-the-market theory.
104
  In essence, Basic holds that 
where a stock is actively traded, a court may presume that the investor 
relies on the integrity of the market price and thus any misrepresentations 
that may have affected that price.  But the Supreme Court made it quite 
clear that the presumption is rebuttable: 
Any showing that severs the link between the alleged 
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the 
plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.  For example, if 
petitioners could show that the “market makers” were privy to 
the truth about the merger discussions here with Combustion, and 
thus that the market price would not have been affected by their 
misrepresentations, the causal connection could be broken:  the 
basis for finding that the fraud had been transmitted through 
market price would be gone.  Similarly, if, despite petitioners’ 
allegedly fraudulent attempt to manipulate market price, news of 
 
requirement is nothing more than a redundancy.  The presumption must be that it creates an 
additional somewhat higher hurdle in actions for damages.  See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 590–94 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559–60 (2011) (applying a separate predominance test as a hurdle 
for a plaintiff seeking class certification to meet). 
 102. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 103. As the Supreme Court stated in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988):  
Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed 
plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding 
with a class action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the 
common ones.  The District Court found that the presumption of reliance 
created by the fraud-on-the-market theory provided ‘a practical resolution to the 
problem of balancing the substantive requirement of proof of reliance in 
securities cases against the procedural requisites of [Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure] 23.’  The District Court thus concluded that with reference to each 
public statement and its impact on the open market for Basic shares, common 
questions predominated over individual questions, as required by Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and (b)(3). 
 104. Id. 
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the merger discussions credibly entered the market and dissipated 
the effects of the misstatements, those who traded Basic shares 
after the corrective statements would have no direct or indirect 
connection with the fraud.  Petitioners also could rebut the 
presumption of reliance as to plaintiffs who would have divested 
themselves of their Basic shares without relying on the integrity 
of the market.  For example, a plaintiff who believed that Basic’s 
statements were false and that Basic was indeed engaged in 
merger discussions, and who consequently believed that Basic 
stock was artificially underpriced, but sold his shares 
nevertheless because of other unrelated concerns, e.g., potential 
antitrust problems, or political pressures to divest from shares of 
certain businesses, could not be said to have relied on the 
integrity of a price he knew had been manipulated.”
105
 
It is fair to presume that a well-diversified, portfolio-balancing 
investor relies on the integrity of market prices when she trades.  Such an 
investor is (almost) by definition a passive price-taker.  Indeed, the very 
idea of portfolio balancing depends on using market prices of portfolio 
stocks to determine the amount of each stock that one should buy or sell.  
But it is not at all clear that the same presumption should apply to an 
undiversified investor.  To the contrary, an undiversified investor is by 
definition a stock-picker who presumably must have some reason for 
picking the stocks he picks.  In other words, such an investor may be 
presumed to choose a stock precisely because he thinks the market price is 
wrong in some sense.  To be sure, such an investor must think the price is 
too low when instead it is too high.  Nevertheless, it is fair to presume that 
an undiversified investor bases his investment decisions on something other 
than the integrity of the market price. 
Basic is an unusual case and less than an ideal precedent.  It is atypical 
in that it involves a cover-up of good news, whereas the vast majority of 
securities fraud class actions involve the cover-up of bad news.
106
  As a 
 
 105. Id. at 248–49. 
 106. As noted above, data for one recent year show that only 2 out of 119 securities 
fraud class actions involved the cover-up of good news.  One might think that this skewing 
is the result of a natural tendency to delay the disclosure of bad news in the hope that it 
might go away or (more cynically) because bad news is a better opportunity for insider 
trading because one can be more certain that bad news will cause stock price to decline than 
one can be certain that good news will cause stock price to increase.  But feedback is 
probably a more important reason for the predominance of bad-news cases.  To be specific, 
securities fraud class actions have the effect of magnifying the effects of bad news but of 
muting the effects of good news (which may also limit the opportunities for insider trading 
in good-news cases).  In any event, one would expect a somewhat more even distribution 
between good-news cases and bad-news cases.  The fact that the numbers are as skewed as 
they are suggests that there must be some distorting factor at work.  That factor is securities 
fraud class actions. 
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result, the court illustrates its point by suggesting that there may be cases in 
which an investor sells a stock even though he thinks it may be 
underpriced.  The problem is that one would never buy a stock that one 
thinks is overpriced.  The fact that the plaintiffs in Basic already held Basic 
shares is crucial to the analysis.  What the court probably should have said 
is that it makes no difference why one sells (or buys).  The whole idea of 
reliance on the integrity of the market—rather than reliance on market 
price—is that one can presume that the market price is fair and nonetheless 
decide to trade. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine a situation involving a buyer 
that is roughly parallel to the examples given by the Court in Basic.  For 
example, suppose that a company has announced that it expects sales to 
increase over the next year, but the investor thinks that sales will be weak.  
Moreover, the investor thinks that the market also thinks that sales will be 
weak and has discounted share price.  But the investor thinks the market 
has overreacted.  So the investor buys the stock.  It seems clear that the 
presumption of reliance would be rebutted in such a situation. 
To be fair, it is conceivable that an investor might pick a stock that he 
thinks is likely to increase in price (by more than the market as a whole) 
while at the same time he thinks the stock is fairly priced—or at least not 
fraudulently priced.  Indeed, that would seem to be a more or less normal 
way for an investor to think even if it is ultimately misguided to do so.  
And it is probably the reason that the court used the phrase “integrity of the 
market price” rather than a more straightforward formulation suggesting 
that the market price is presumed to be correct.
107
  In other words, there is 




It is also conceivable that some undiversified investors choose 
individual stocks that they think are safe investments for the long haul and 
do in fact rely on the integrity of the market price in doing so.  But such an 
investor is much more likely to invest in a diversified portfolio of stocks as 
a way of reducing risk even more (and at little or no cost) and indeed as a 
way of hedging against the possibility that the stock is overvalued.  So even 
if there are some such safety-seeking investors who remain undiversified, it 
seems likely that many undiversified investors choose stocks because they 
think the market price is wrong. 
The bottom line is that, even if there are some undiversified investors 
 
 107. Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 247. 
 108. The idea of the integrity of the market price also makes it clear that market prices 
may change for reasons that do not give rise to a claim for securities fraud.  In other words, 
the idea is that the process by which prices are set is fair even if the price itself is not always 
fair.  So the idea of the integrity of the market price leaves plenty of room for the courts to 
distinguish between cases in which investors have a remedy and those in which they do not. 
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who do rely on the integrity of the market price, there is no reason to 
presume that they do so.  Indeed, it is fair to presume that a significant 
number of undiversified investors trade because they think the market price 
is wrong.  That alone is enough to raise significant individual questions that 
preclude class certification. 
Even if it could be presumed that all of the buyers in the potential 
plaintiff class relied on the market price (or the integrity thereof), important 
individual questions remain to be resolved in determining who should be in 
the plaintiff class.  Assuming for the sake of argument that the court has 
ruled that a class action may proceed in which the plaintiff class will 
comprise only those buyers who stand to gain more than they lose if the 
action succeeds, how would the representative plaintiff go about 
identifying the members of the class?  As discussed above (and still further 
in the appendix), the determination of who should be in the class would 
depend on the number of shares bought versus the number of shares held 
and the ultimate size of the plaintiff class.  So there is no way to determine 
the size of the plaintiff class unless the size of the plaintiff class is already 
known.  To be sure, one could in theory determine the holdings and 
purchases of every stockholder of the subject company at every moment 
during the class period.  But that would involve discovery from a large 
number of investors who will ultimately be excluded from the plaintiff 
class. 
Another possibility is that the plaintiff would limit the class to 
investors who bought the subject stock during the fraud period but who did 
not hold any shares of the subject stock that were acquired before the fraud 
period began.  Adequacy of representation notwithstanding, this seems like 
a relatively simple definition, but it is not clear how each investor would 
prove that she did not own some shares from before the class period.  There 
would be significant incentive (and opportunity) to cheat since buyer-




Admittedly, these individual issues are not about the merits of the 
corresponding claims.  Rather, they are issues that relate more to the 
definition of the class.  Thus, one might argue that they are not really issues 
of preponderance but rather issues of manageability.  Nevertheless, the 
issues are real and the courts have considered them under the rubric of 
 
 109. Moreover, a class as so defined may be so small that it might not even satisfy the 
numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a).  Nevertheless, given that the ultimate size of the 
plaintiff class as so defined is likely to be quite small, feedback is likely to be minimal.  
Thus, it might be argued that feedback loss can safely be ignored.  But if one ignores 
feedback loss, the plaintiff class swells to include anyone who bought any shares during the 
fraud period, including those who owned significant numbers of shares acquired earlier, and 
feedback once again becomes a factor. 
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  And even if they are not really issues of preponderance, 
manageability is itself a factor to be considered, as discussed further below. 
2. Superiority 
In addition to requiring that common questions predominate, an action 
may be certified as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action only if the Rule 23(b)(3) 
class action is superior to other modes of litigation, including the other 
categories of class actions set forth in the rule.  Moreover, in determining 
whether a class action is superior, Rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to 
consider:  (A) the interests of members of the class in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, (B) the extent 
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced 
by or against members of the class, (C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, and (D) 
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class 
action.  All of these factors are problematic.  Factor (A) is a problem 
because many members of the class would prefer that derivative claims be 
prosecuted derivatively and that direct claims be dismissed.  Factor (B) is a 
problem because a derivative action arguably provides complete relief 
without untoward side effects.  Factor (C) is a problem because a derivative 
action is better handled in state court.  Finally, factor (D) is a problem, 
because (among other things) (1) it is difficult to draw the line between 
diversified and undiversified investors, and (2) undiversified investors must 
presumably show reliance. 
a. Member Interest 
The first superiority factor that must be considered is the interest of 
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense 
of separate actions.  It seems clear that if there are claims that can be 
addressed either as direct claims or as derivative claims, they should be 
addressed as derivative claims.  This is not to say that a claim can be both 
direct and derivative (although that may be possible).  Rather, as shown 
here, there are elements of potential recovery that should be handled as 
derivative claims even though they are usually treated as part of the class 
claim.  It may suffice simply to show that such claims are derivative since 
 
 110. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 29–31 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(describing a preponderance standard for courts to apply in determining whether a plaintiff 
has meet the requirements of Rule 23); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 594 
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–
52 (2011) (holding that district courts may also consider issues overlapping with the merits 
in completing a Rule 23 analysis). 
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it is not clear that a court has discretion to treat such claims as direct.  It is 
also arguable that the derivative action is the default rule.  In other words, 
the burden is on the party that would maintain a class action to show why it 
should not be maintained as a derivative action.
111
 But the point is that 
some members of the plaintiff class have a compelling interest in seeing the 
claims litigated as derivative claims.  
Although this factor focuses on the interests of members of the class, 
one obviously needs to know who is in the class in order to consider their 
interests.  Thus, this factor depends on the definition of the class.  If the 
action is pursued derivatively, one could argue that all of the stockholders 
(including mere holders and perhaps the corporation itself) are in fact 




 111. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 112. In a setting other than securities litigation, if a large number of class members 
choose to opt out of the class action, either at the outset or by failure to file a claim, it is 
presumably a good indication that the class action is not superior to other ways of resolving 
the dispute.  There is no need for the court to look into why so many potential class 
members opted out—the fact speaks for itself.  Accordingly, the courts have declined to 
certify such actions or have decertified such actions as were previously certified.  But 
securities litigation is different.  Many buyers will rationally decline to opt out even though 
they oppose securities fraud class actions because by opting out they lose even more.   
  One possible way to circumvent such strategic behavior might be to poll the 
potential class to determine if a class action should proceed as a class action or as a 
derivative action.  Such a vote of the potential plaintiff class would be a better way to get an 
accurate reading of investor preferences than the opt-out system.  With a vote, potential 
class members could register their preferences without the need to sacrifice class 
membership if the action goes forward.  That is, a diversified investor could vote NO in the 
hope that the action will be dismissed.  If the action goes forward, he may remain in the 
class and get his share of any recovery.  In short, voting would be much more sensible than 
the opt-out system we have.   
  For a discussion of similar advantages in connection with stockholder voting as 
compared with tender offers as a way of assessing stockholder preferences, see Richard A. 
Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988) and Richard 
A. Booth, The New Law of Freeze-Out Mergers, 49 MO. L. REV. 517 (1984).  Such a vote 
may be authorized implicitly under the notice provisions of Rule 23(c).  One potential 
problem with voting is that only buyers may be class members in an action for damages, and 
a court might well limit the vote to potential class members.  Moreover, a diversified 
investor who is opposed in principle to securities fraud class actions may nonetheless vote 
for an individual class action because he gets to vote only when he might gain from the 
action.   
  Indeed, a diversified investor may figure that he really must vote in favor of the 
class action (painful as it is to do so) because other diversified investors (who may not 
understand their interests so well) will vote in favor of other actions in which they stand to 
gain. So even if the matter is put up to a vote, an investor may vote in favor of a class 
action—even  though he opposes class actions in principle—because he must remain in the 
actions for which he is eligible in order to recoup the losses he suffers from actions in which 
he is a mere holder.   
  The one group that will invariably vote against a class action is non-buyer holders.  
But it is not clear that they can vote unless the vote is one of all potential class members 
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b. Other Litigation 
The second superiority factor that must be considered is the extent and 
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by 
or against members of the class. 
It seems clear that if a derivative action is pending, a court may 
decline to certify the class action as a class action on grounds that the 
derivative action is superior (even though it covers only a portion of the 
class claim).  But what if no derivative action has been filed?  Can the court 
convert a class action into a derivative action?  And can a court do so on its 
own motion?  The question is somewhat academic in that there is nothing 
to stop a diversified investor from filing a derivative action when 
warranted.  But even in the absence of a pending derivative claim, it seems 
quite clear that a court may convert a direct action into a derivative action 
on its own motion. 
First (and again), the characterization of an action is a matter for the 
court.  It is not up to the representative plaintiff to decide what form the 
action will take.
113
  The characterization of the action is akin to a question 
of subject matter jurisdiction that the court can raise on its own motion.  
Indeed, it is difficult to see how the law could be otherwise in the context 
of a representative action involving absent parties.  And this is particularly 
true in the context of securities litigation where PSLRA and SLUSA have 
given the courts even more power to manage class actions.  Not only does 
the court have the power to appoint a representative plaintiff, it also has the 
power to treat multiple individual actions as class actions even when they 
are not filed as such.  The court can also remove state actions that assert 
direct claims based on a failure of disclosure even where the result is to 
dismiss the claim as a matter of federal law.
114
  Moreover, SLUSA 
 
including those who might be class members (so to speak) in a derivative action.  (One way 
that the vote could be conducted would be to permit all stockholders to vote either for a 
class action or a derivative action.)  Finally, as a practical matter, few individual investors 
would bother to vote or vote intelligently if any such vote were conducted.  This too may 
justify judicial intervention.   
  On the other hand, institutional investors—who presumably have the most votes—
might consider the matter quite seriously.  Even in the absence of a vote, the fact that many 
investors might be inclined to vote strategically and contrary to their overall interest 
suggests that securities fraud class actions are infected by a market failure that justifies a 
court—particularly in a representative action—to consider the interests of absent class 
members in deciding whether to certify a securities fraud action as a class action.  This is 
discussed further in connection with policy considerations in Section IV. infra. 
 113. See, e.g., Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 407 F.3d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 2005); Cowin v. 
Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Shirvanian v. DeFrates, 161 S.W.3d 102, 110 
(Tex. App. 2004) (providing examples of courts deciding that the claims at issue had to be 
brought as a derivative ones). 
 114. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D, 28(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4, 78bb(f) (2006).  
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expressly exempts state law derivative claims from federal preemption 
even in cases in which the claim is based on a failure of disclosure.  
Clearly, this regulatory scheme depends on the courts to distinguish direct 
actions from derivative actions and indeed to recharacterize one as the 
other when necessary. 
Second, Rule 23 itself seems to contemplate both types of actions.  To 
be sure, Rule 23.1 expressly addresses derivative actions.  But Rule 
23(b)(2) also speaks to the issue in that it states that a class action may be 
maintained if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class 
as a whole.”
115
  Thus, Rule 23 apparently overlaps with Rule 23.1.  Indeed, 
it is often said that a derivative action is really two actions in one: an 
equitable action to compel the corporation to sue and an action by the 
corporation seeking damages or restitution from those who did the 
corporation wrong. 
The question is:  Can (or should) the court certify an action under Rule 
23(b)(3) when it could also certify an action under Rule 23(b)(2)?  The 
rules quite clearly answer this question in the negative.  Rule 23(b)(3) is 
available only if the action cannot be certified under another 
category.
116
Moreover, a derivative action represents a greater number of 
stockholders in that it represents buyers, buyer-holders, and holders.  To be 
sure, mere holders have no standing to sue for damages under federal law 
and thus may not be class members in an action for damages.  But a holder 
may maintain a derivative action.  Indeed only a holder may maintain a 
derivative action.
117
Admittedly, per share recovery is likely to be smaller in 
a derivative action because the recovery is spread over a larger number of 
stockholders. And the aggregate amount at issue is likely to be smaller 
since it does not include the fundamental decrease or feedback.  But buyers 
effectively recoup some of the losses they would have suffered because 
there is no feedback effect in a derivative action as there is in a class 
action.
118
  Buyers can hardly complain about a smaller recovery if it is 
 
See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 74 (2006) 
(holding that SLUSA applies broadly to preempt state-law class action claims brought by 
holders of securities). 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 116. See DeBoer v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that 
certification is appropriate under subsection (b)(2) if classwide injunctive relief is sought 
when the defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the 
class”). 
 117. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (requiring that the representative plaintiff in a derivative 
action must have been a stockholder in the company at the time of the wrong). 
 118. Again, if the plaintiff class comprises 50% of the stockholders, feedback will 
double the price decrease.  So if such an action is styled as a derivative action rather than a 
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because they suffered a smaller loss in the first place. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, a successful derivative action 
leaves a buyer in exactly the same position that she would have been in if 
there had been no fraud.  If there had been no fraud, the buyer presumably 
would have bought and suffered a loss when stock price fell. 
c. Forum Choice 
The third superiority factor that must be considered is the desirability 
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum.  Arguably, this factor has been rendered largely irrelevant 
by the possibility of multidistrict litigation.  But it takes on new relevance 
if some part of the class claim is in fact a derivative claim.  Presumably, a 
state law fiduciary duty claim is more appropriately litigated in state court 
than in federal court.  This is particularly true where the question is one of 
corporation law.  Indeed, the Delaware Court of Chancery—which is the 
court where most such actions would be litigated—is uniquely well-suited 
to such litigation.
119
  While it may seem a bit odd to suggest that a federal 
court should defer to a state court, it is well settled that federal securities 
law does not supplant the state law of fiduciary duty.  Indeed, as discussed 
above, federal securities law depends largely on the state law of fiduciary 
duty.
120
  To be sure, there is no reason that a federal court could not hear a 
case sounding in state law fiduciary duty as long as the federal court has 
jurisdiction over the matter.  But it is also clear that a federal court could 




The fourth superiority factor that must be considered is any difficulty 
likely to be encountered in the management of the class action.  Needless to 
say, it is much more efficient to treat a claim as derivative rather than direct 
when it is possible to do so.  In a derivative action, the award goes to one 
claimant—the corporation.  There is no need to deal with hundreds or 
thousands of individual investors or the issues that go with notice and the 
right to opt out, proof of claims, calculation and payment of awards, and so 
forth.  In short, a derivative action is much simpler to manage. 
Moreover, as noted above, there is no good way to know the size of 
 
class action, buyers effectively recover half of their losses from the elimination of feedback. 
 119. See Booth, supra note 77, at 204–05. And see note 48 supra. 
 120. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 121. Presumably, the federal court could retain jurisdiction to resolve any remaining 
direct claims under federal securities law after the resolution of the state law fiduciary duty 
claims. 
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the plaintiff class in a class action.  At first blush, one might think that the 
number of shares represented in the plaintiff class is equal to the number of 
shares traded during the fraud period.  But it is likely that many of those 
shares have traded multiple times during the class period.  For example, 
suppose that the class period is one year and that during that time volume 
for the stock in question—turnover—has been equal to 100% of 
outstanding shares.  It is possible, though unlikely, that the company now 
has a completely new set of shareholders. It is also possible that 20% of the 
shares traded five times during the year and that 80% of the shares did not 
trade at all. There are innumerable possibilities. There is no way to 
determine the size of the plaintiff class short of sending out notice to 
everyone who bought during the fraud period.
 122
  Although the courts have 
managed to deal with this problem in practice, the problem can be 
eliminated altogether to the extent that claims are resolved in a derivative 
action in which the corporation recovers for the benefit of all of the 
stockholders. 
Finally, as also noted above, if one considers the differing interests of 
investors with differing trading styles, it is difficult if not impossible to 
define the class and to determine who should be a member.  Again, the size 
of the class determines who is likely to favor the class action.  But the size 
of the class cannot be known unless one knows who is likely to favor the 
class action. 
C.  Litigation Strategy 
It may seem curious that no one has raised the argument that some of 
the typical class claim is really derivative rather than direct.  There are 
 
 122. In other words, one of the intractable problems with securities fraud class actions is 
that there is no way to know how many different shares have been damaged because many 
of the same shares may have been bought and sold during the class period.  As in a game of 
musical chairs, many players may change position, even though only one comes up short. 
See generally Robert A. Alessi, The Emerging Judicial Hostility to the Typical Damages 
Model Employed by Plaintiffs in Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 56 BUS. LAW. 483 
(2001).  Thus, under current practice the courts do not usually know how many shares are 
represented by the plaintiff class or the aggregate amount of damages that would be awarded 
if the plaintiff wins.  Needless to say, ignorance of the potential damages makes settlement 
negotiations difficult.  It has also led to the invention of some highly questionable models 
that purport to estimate the number of damaged shares.  Id. at 488–89.  Alessi argues that 
notice should go out and that class members should be required to file claims (together with 
documentation) before the court approves any settlement because that is the only way to 
determine accurately the number of damaged shares.  It seems odd that such is not the usual 
practice anyway.  One would think that a class member should be required to declare before 
knowing the outcome.  But that might necessitate the expense of notice on two occasions—
once to solicit claim forms and (possibly) a second time to approve the settlement.  Indeed it 
has become a common practice in class actions outside securities fraud class actions to send 
multiple rounds of notice.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(B). 
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several answers. 
First, it may be that plaintiffs worry that insurance may not cover 
many derivative claims.  Since a derivative claim is one by the corporation 
usually against its own directors and officers, it may not be clear that 
insurance will pay.
123
  The same reasons may also explain why corporations 
do not seek to recharacterize class actions as derivative actions in order to 
take control and either dismiss or settle the claim.  Management—the 
potential individual defendants—may worry that they would not be covered 
by insurance in connection with a derivative claim.
124
 
Second, since in a derivative action the corporation is the real plaintiff 
and management is the primary defendant, it is impossible for the two to 
present a unified defense.  In a class action, the corporation and 




 123. This may also explain why the plaintiff lawyers who do handle derivative actions 
have declined to challenge those who handle class actions.  It may be that class action 
lawyers are willing (in effect) to share their fees with derivative action lawyers and that for 
the latter the practice is lucrative enough to forgo asserting the primacy of the derivative 
action. 
 124. Litigation is often mostly about settlement. Although the merits matter—at least in 
the sense that the law must provide for a claim if one is to have a case—litigation is often an 
extension of negotiation.  It may be that it is easier for a corporation to persuade its 
insurance company to pay others than to pay the corporation that bought the policy.  Indeed, 
it appears that most insurance companies permit the defendant corporation to direct the 
defense of securities fraud class actions.  An insurance company may not be so 
accommodating in a derivative action where management is effectively on both sides of the 
litigation.  Moreover, it is not at all clear that directors and officers insurance as currently 
written would cover all of the derivative claims discussed here.  On the other hand, there is 
no reason why an insurance company should not be interested in offering a new product if 
there is money to be made.  For example, AIG offered earnings insurance for a time.  That 
is, it offered a policy that would make up for a covered earnings shortfall.  See Richard A. 
Booth, Reducing Risk Doesn’t Pay Off, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1999, at A18 (arguing that 
stock holders, on average, do not like risk management instruments).  Moreover, it has been 
suggested that one way to assure that auditors do not kowtow to the companies they audit 
might be for them to buy insurance against earnings restatements, which would induce the 
insurance companies to monitor both reporting companies and their auditors.  An insurance 
company would likely pay out less in a derivative action than in a class action.  On the other 
hand—in the grander scheme—insurance companies may make more money by selling 
policies to cover larger claims.  Nevertheless, saving now by paying out less is a bird-in-
hand. Here market failure may militate for the right result.  Finally, it might also be possible 
to devise a governance provision akin to Delaware’s § 102(b)(7) that deals with the 
redistribution problem by limiting the right of any stockholder to seek compensation from 
the company or providing that in the event a securities fraud class action is filed against the 
company, the company may assume control of the action as in a derivative action.  DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012). 
 125. See Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683 (Del. Ch. 2010), abrogated by Kahn v. Kolberg 
Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 836–40 (Del. 2011).  On the other hand, if management 
prevails, it presumably will be indemnified by the corporation.  Indeed, even if management 
is held liable to the corporation, it may be indemnified by court order as long as no personal 
benefit was involved. 
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Third, the procedures governing derivative actions are not plaintiff-
friendly.  The representative plaintiff must make a demand on the board of 
directors to sue—since the claim belongs to the corporation—unless it 
would be futile to do so.  And even in cases of demand futility, the 
corporation can later take control of derivative action and seek to have it 
dismissed as contrary to the best interests of the corporation.
126
  So the 
plaintiff lawyer has much less control over a derivative action than a class 
action.  Indeed, there is a perception that corporations are able to have 
derivative actions dismissed in many meritorious cases.  On the other hand, 
there is little doubt that corporations settle many securities fraud class 
actions that are not meritorious. 
Fourth, even though the courts have the power (if not the duty) to 
recharacterize a portion of the typical class action claim as derivative, it 
also seems unlikely that the courts will do so on their own motion.  
Moreover, individual courts cannot escape their own opt-out problem: 
Other courts may continue to certify class actions to the detriment of the 
diversified investors.  No court other than the Supreme Court can afford to 
give too much thought to cases other than the one before it. 
Finally, it may be that no one ever thought to make the argument (if I 
do say so myself).
127
 The most likely party to advocate for any such change 
would seem to be an index fund, since as a portfolio-balancing investor, 
such a fund almost always loses more from securities fraud class actions 
than it gains.  The problem is that not even index funds really appreciate 
the fact that they lose more from securities fraud class actions than they 
gain.  It is difficult to appreciate the costs when the only tangible evidence 
one ever sees is a big settlement check.
128
 
IV.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
To be clear, it is not the argument here that the courts should deny 
certification because investors in the aggregate would be better off in a 
world without securities fraud class actions (even though that is true).  
Rather, the argument is (1) that part of the claim in any meritorious 
securities fraud class action is in fact derivative rather than direct, (2) that 
intra-class conflicts preclude certification, (3) that individual questions as 
to reliance and the definition of the class overwhelm common questions, 
 
 126. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that, “in the 
normal course of events, a decision whether to bring suit is a corporate economic decision 
subject to the business judgment rule.”). 
 127. But see In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 2000); In re 
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 285 (D.N.J. 2000); aff’d, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 128. See Richard A. Booth, Index Funds and Securities Litigation (forthcoming). 
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and (4) that a derivative action is superior to a class action. 
Although the foregoing arguments against certification are convincing 
(if not overwhelming), the fact remains that the remaining direct claims of 
individual buyers for investment losses (if any) cannot be litigated by 
derivative action unless one allows for individual recovery against 
individual defendants.  This does not necessarily mean that buyers have 
lost their remedy.  It is always possible for a buyer to sue individually or 
together with other buyers (as long as the number of plaintiffs is fewer than 
fifty).
129
  All that is lost is the ability to maintain a class action (which is 
hardly a matter of right).  Indeed, in many ways it may be preferable not to 
proceed by class action since one can avoid the additional hurdles imposed 
on class actions by PSLRA and SLUSA.
130
 
Still, to be realistic, it is unlikely that many individual investors will 
sue in the absence of the ability to maintain a class action.  The practical 
implication is that individual claims for investment losses will simply go 
uncompensated—a wrong (perhaps) without a remedy.  So, the question is, 
should the courts muscle through the requirements of Rule 23 in order to 
maintain the institution of securities fraud class actions however flawed 
they may be?  Is the fact that securities fraud will go unavenged a good 
enough reason to permit class actions to go forward? 
One obvious argument for keeping securities fraud class actions is that 
they provide an important source of deterrence.  In their absence, managers 
might be inclined to cover up bad news and even to lie to the market.  The 
obvious response is that a derivative action also provides deterrence.  
Moreover, most observers agree that as a disciplinary tool, securities fraud 
class actions are overkill.
131
  A derivative action is a more proportional 
response.  So deterrence is no rationale for a class action. 
 
 129. Under SLUSA, all actions for individual damages based on a theory of 
nondisclosure and involving fifty or more plaintiffs must be handled as federal class actions.  
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2006). 
 130. One of the big attractions of class actions is that attorney fees get paid out of the 
award. See FED. R. CIV. P.23(h). But the same is effectively true in a derivative action where 
attorney fees are paid by the corporation on the theory that the derivative action benefits all 
of the stockholders and not just those who filed suit.  A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. 
GOVERNANCE § 7.17 (1994). 
 131. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1585 (2006) (arguing that 
securities litigation is “a process by which the parties shift liabilities created by the 
corporate managers onto shareholders through the medium of costly insurance paid for by 
shareholders.”); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring 
the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1301, 1363 (2008) (arguing that “[c]lassic law and economics scholarship, however, 
casts considerable doubt on the desirability of utilizing Rule 10b-5 class actions as an 
additional deterrent.”); see also COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS Regulation 78–79 (2006) (evaluating “the 
legal and regulatory underpinnings of U.S. public capital markets”). 
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Neither do investors have any need for a direct remedy.  It is not clear 
that investors suffer any genuine harm beyond the harm that can be 
remedied by a derivative action.  Again, diversified investors are hedged 
against securities fraud by virtue of being diversified.  They are just as 
likely to sell an overpriced stock as they are to buy one.  It all comes out in 
the wash.  Indeed, the cost of litigation is a deadweight loss to the system 
that ultimately reduces investor return.  Clearly, diversified investors would 
be better off in a world without securities fraud class actions.
132
  To be sure, 
securities fraud class actions may make sense from the viewpoint of an 
undiversified investor.  An undiversified investor may suffer real harm 
from securities fraud.  An investor who forgoes the benefits of 
diversification and picks a few good stocks runs the risk that one of those 
stocks will be the next Enron or WorldCom.
133
  On the other hand, such an 
investor may gain if she happens to sell an overpriced stock.  Moreover, 
such an investor may also lose as a mere holder.  Thus, even an 
undiversified investor would oppose securities fraud class actions if she 
were utterly risk-neutral.  Nevertheless, for an undiversified investor, the 




 132. To the contrary, Alicia Davis has argued that many investors may lose from 
securities fraud—and that many investors may also win—but that diversification does not 
guarantee that losers will balance out winners for all investors. Alicia J. Davis, Are 
Investors’ Gains and Losses from Securities Fraud Equal Over Time? Theory and Evidence 
(Empirical Legal Studies Ctr. at Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 09-002, 
2010).  Indeed, she argues that most investors will either be net losers or net winners and 
that relatively few will break even.  In addition, using Monte Carlo simulations involving 
investors who use a variety of trading strategies, she shows that on average and in the 
aggregate investors lose a little more from securities fraud than they gain.  While the former 
goes without saying, Davis offers no good explanation for the latter, other than to suggest 
that to gain from securities fraud one must own a fraud-affected stock and then sell it before 
the truth comes out (which she suggests is less likely than simply buying a fraud-affected 
stock).  Although it is a mystery why investors should on average come out just a little 
behind as a result of securities fraud, that does not show that investors would therefore favor 
a class action remedy.  First, the study apparently assumes all or nothing trading, which is 
not likely to be the pattern of most investors.  Second, the study does not account for the 
losses that holders suffer as a result of securities fraud class actions.  And needless to say, 
the study does not factor in any recovery that investors might enjoy as a result of meaningful 
derivative recovery. 
 133. Studies indicate that the average individual investor holds four different stocks.  See 
supra note 16 and accompanying text. If one of those stocks turns out to be worthless, the 
investor would suffer a twenty-five percent loss (assuming equal weighting by value). 
 134. It is worth noting here that many courts have permitted actions against trustees for 
losses on imprudent investments even though the losses are more than offset by gains from 
other investments and even though trust law requires diversification.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 213 (1959); see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling 
Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Investor Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52 (1987) 
(criticizing the so-called anti-netting rule).  This suggests that many courts may not 
appreciate the significance of diversification, which in turn may explain why the courts have 
tolerated securities fraud class actions. 
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It may be helpful to think about securities fraud class actions as a form 
of investment insurance.  People usually buy insurance against major 
losses.  They do not usually buy insurance against minor losses.  A 
diversified investor is naturally insured against securities fraud by virtue of 
being diversified.  She cannot lose much even if one of her stocks proves to 
be worthless.  For a diversified investor, it is a waste of money to buy 
additional insurance because one is already covered.  One is self-insured.  
But an undiversified investor may find insurance to be worth the cost.  Just 
as one may gain peace of mind from buying insurance—even though one 
pays but never collects—an undiversified investor may find it a good deal 
to be protected against securities fraud by securities fraud class actions.  In 
other words, insurance always costs a bit more than it is worth—otherwise, 
insurance companies would go out of business.  But it may still be worth 
the candle to buy insurance.  For an undiversified investor, securities fraud 
class actions are similar to buying fire insurance on one’s house, whereas 
for a diversified investor, securities fraud class actions are equivalent to 




 135. There is an important difference between insurance and diversification, however.  
By definition, insurance costs more than it is worth because in the aggregate the insurance 
company pays out less in benefits than it charges in premiums.  Nevertheless, insurance may 
still be a good deal for the buyer if the risk avoided is particularly worrisome.  (This also 
explains why options, futures, and other derivatives have value for investors even though 
the transaction is zero-sum.)  In other words, the individual buyer of insurance may gain 
even though buyers lose in the aggregate.  As with diversification, the value of insurance 
inheres in spreading the risk.  Each buyer of insurance agrees in effect to suffer a small 
fraction of the worrisome loss and to pay a little bit more in addition to the insurance 
company for its services in spreading the risk. But diversification is a much better deal.  
First, it is effectively free.  Although it may cost a bit in management fees to invest with a 
mutual fund, it costs as much or more to maintain an individual brokerage account.  Second, 
the risk of loss is eliminated altogether because for every stock that suffers an unexpected 
loss, there is another that enjoys an unexpected gain.  In contrast, there is no upside with 
insurance. Some number of people will die.  Some number of fires will happen.  There is no 
gain (except for the insurance company) if losses fail to materialize.  The same is true with 
fixed-income securities such as bonds and preferred stock.  Although one can avoid the 
danger of catastrophic losses through diversification, such securities do not offer much (if 
any) upside potential. So there are never any gains to offset loses.  One can only minimize 
losses.  Thus, the beauty of diversification in the stock market is due partly to the fact that 
common stock represents a residual ownership interest in the company.  Any unexpected 
gain goes in effect to the stockholders.  The same rationale ultimately justifies the business 
judgment rule. See generally Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders 
(Or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429 (1998) 
(discussing the interplay of diversification and fiduciary duties).  In most cases, we let losses 
lie where they fall because investors are presumed to understand that unexpected losses are 
offset by unexpected gains (at least in the absence of self-dealing or similar duty of loyalty 
problems).  There is nothing to be gained from litigation.  The same is true of securities 
fraud (broadly defined).  There is nothing to be gained from litigation since one is just as 
likely to sell an overpriced stock as to buy one.  Indeed, even with securities fraud we let 
losses lie where they fall unless the plaintiff can show that there was a duty to disclose and 
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In the end, there is a fundamental conflict between the interests of 
diversified investors and the interests of undiversified investors.  
Diversified investors should be opposed to securities fraud class actions 
while undiversified investors would likely favor such actions.  While 
undiversified investors may be happy to forgo some investment return for 
the peace of mind that goes with being (somewhat) insured against 
catastrophic losses, diversified investors do not want or need such 




Since there is no way that the law can serve both diversified and 
undiversified investors at the same time, the ultimate question is which 
class of investors to favor.  The answer is really quite easy.  In case of 
conflict, the law should favor diversified investors.  First, it is clear that 
diversified investors constitute the larger population of investors.
137
  
Second, investors should be presumed to be diversified.  It is irrational for 
passive investors—most investors—not to diversify because by doing so 
one can eliminate the company-specific risk that goes with picking stocks 
and investing in individual companies without any reduction in expected 
return.  The ultimate goal for an investor is to maximize return at a given 
level of risk.  It is therefore irrational for an investor to fail to reduce risk if 
it is costless to do so.  Federal securities law is intended to protect 
reasonable investors.
138
  Since reasonable investors diversify, it follows that 
the interests of diversified investors should trump those of undiversified 
investors.  If there is a need to choose, the choice is clear.  The law should 




an intentional breach of that duty—scienter. 
 136. Thus, a securities fraud class action can fairly be characterized as a subsidy running 
from diversified investors to undiversified investors.  Needless to say, if undiversified 
investors could buy insurance from some other source, diversified investors would 
presumably have no objection if they did so.  Indeed, it is perfectly possible to buy such 
insurance in the form of options and other derivative instruments.  So the fact that 
diversified investors are effectively required to pay through a system of securities fraud 
class actions is particularly irksome. 
 137. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 138. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976) (basing its 
holding on consideration of a reasonable investor’s judgment). 
 139. Moreover, denying a remedy to undiversified investors creates an added incentive 
to diversify.  One might even say that federal securities law should ignore the interests of 
undiversified investors just as the definition of materiality ignores the interests of 
stockholders who merely might be interested in the disclosure of a particular item of 
information.  See TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 463 (holding that an omitted fact in a proxy 
statement is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
consider it important in deciding how to vote).  One could also argue that an investor who 
voluntarily assumes unnecessary risk by failing to diversify when possible should be denied 
a remedy on grounds similar to assumption of risk in tort.  But as I have argued elsewhere, 
such an investor might have a claim against her broker or investment adviser.  See Richard 
BOOTH_FINALIZEDTHREE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012  11:24 AM 
764 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
Finally, even if one sees this conflict of investor interests as a toss-up, 
the potential benefits of derivative recovery tip the scales decidedly against 
class certification since a derivative action benefits all stockholders, 
eliminates feedback both as an element of damages and as a loss for 
holders, and leaves buyers in the same position as they would have been in 
the absence of fraud.
140
 
The question remains whether a court may deny class certification 
solely on the ground that a class action is contrary to the interests of 
reasonable investors.  It seems clear that if they could vote on the matter 
behind a veil of ignorance—not knowing whether they are buyers, sellers, 
 
A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to Measure Risk, 
54 BUS. LAW. 1599, 1602 (1999) (discussing 
[T]he actionability of suitability claims . . . . the  theory  and  practice  of 
diversification . . .  and the  motivations  that may lead a broker  to  recommend  
excessively  risky securities  and investment  strategies and the various methods 
that may be used  to  quantify or compare  risk, focusing  in particular  on how 
spread may be used  as  a surrogate  for the  direct measurement  of risk. 
). See also Richard A. Booth, Damages in Churning Cases, 20 SEC. REG. L. J. 3 (1992) 
(discussing measure of damages in investor disputes with brokers).  This is not to say that an 
undiversified investor should have no remedy if she is a victim of securities fraud.  Some 
investors are rationally undiversified.  For example, it is not irrational for an investor who 
seeks to exercise control over the issuer through the ownership of stock to fail to diversify.  
But such an investor has no need for a class action.  Moreover, if such an investor has a 
claim it is likely to be one against a counterparty to a purchase or sale and not one against 
the issuer. 
 140. As many scholars have noted, defendant companies settle in many cases that appear 
to have little or no merit. That phenomenon may be attributable in part to overdeterrence—
the possibility that class action damages may be far in excess of the real harm to investors 
which itself is partly attributable to feedback. Since there is no feedback in a derivative 
action, the incentive to settle is undistorted and the merits should matter. See Janet Cooper 
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 497, 598 (1991) (arguing that we should “reconsider our faith in the 
propositions that settlements are as good as or better than trial, that procedural rules should 
favor settlement over trial, and that in civil cases any disposition to which the parties agree 
is ipso facto a desirable result.” The abolition of securities fraud class actions might also 
give rise to more derivative claims in good news cases. As noted above, feedback from 
securities fraud class actions has the effect of magnifying the downward price change in a 
bad news case but muting the upward price change in a good news case. Without such 
muting, one would expect a bigger price jump in good news cases. But it is not clear who 
would sue. In other words, it is not clear that cases such as Basic would ever arise as 
derivative actions although it is conceivable that a stockholder might sue on the theory that 
stock price would have increased even further but for feedback and litigation expenses. In 
addition, the approach advocated here could also change how we look at scienter. Although 
the standard would likely be the same, the focus would almost certainly be different. Under 
current law, where the claim belongs to buyers, the focus is largely on whether there is a 
duty to disclose, whether the information is ripe for disclosure, and whether there was an 
illicit motive for nondisclosure. In a derivative action, the focus would likely be on whether 
the responsible officers knew or should have known that nondisclosure would result in an 
increase in the cost of equity or the cost of capital. 
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or holders—diversified investors would likely vote to abolish securities 
fraud class actions altogether.
141
  Indeed, even undiversified investors might 
agree since they too may gain as buyers and lose as holders.  Needless to 
say, in an ordinary non-representative action it is not up to the court to 
decide whether it is wise for a plaintiff to sue.  But in a representative 
action, such as a class action or a derivative action a court has a positive 
duty to consider the interests of absent class members.  It is quite clear that 
in a derivative action the court may decide whether the action is in the best 
interest of the corporation—the absent stockholders—and accordingly 
whether it should proceed or be dismissed.
142
  Many of the same principles 
apply in class actions.  For example, the court must determine that the 
named plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class and must approve 
any settlement.
143
  Thus, a court is clearly justified in considering the 




 141. See supra note 25. 
 142. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 7.10 (1994) (stating the standard of 
review for deciding whether a derivative action should be dismissed). See also FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23.1(c) (stating the same rule found in the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance 
sections 7.14, 7.15); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1982) (refusing to grant 
summary judgment to the corporation on appeal of a derivative claim); Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787–89 (Del. 1981) (holding that power of court to approve 
settlement implies that court has authority to review merits of corporation’s decision to seek 
dismissal); A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE §§ 7.14, 7.15 (1994) (stating that a 
derivative action may not be settled without approval of court and court must determine that 
settlement balance of corporate interests warrants approval). 
 143. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (e). 
 144. The courts could dismiss most securities fraud class actions for failure to state a 
claim for compensable damages—and a fortiori for lack of loss causation.  To be sure, the 
argument requires a court to focus on the net effect of the fraud.  To some extent the courts 
do consider the net interests of the plaintiff class when (for example) they eliminate the 
claims of in-and-out traders in estimating damages.  The tension between individual claims 
and net claims is also evident in the varying approaches to materiality.  The Supreme Court 
has focused on an idealized reasonable investor in formulating the standard that a fact is 
material if a reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding how to act.  But the 
court has emphasized that a fact need not be so important that it would change the investor’s 
decision.  See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238–41 (1988) (refining the materiality 
standard set out in TSC Industries); TSC Indust., Inc., 426 U.S. at 463 (holding that an 
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
consider it important in deciding how to vote); see also Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 
U.S. 375, 384–85 (1970) (discussing materially misleading information in proxy materials); 
Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1087, 1099 (1991) (holding that 
conclusory statements of opinion can be materially misleading, but that the causation 
requirement must be met).  On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that a fact could be 
material if does not change the decision of any investor or if it does not have some effect on 
the market. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346–48 (2005) (holding that to 
establish securities fraud a plaintiff must to show causal connection between 
misrepresentation and fraud and that artificial price inflation alone does not meet the loss 
causation requirement).  Thus, some courts have ruled that for a fact to be material it must 
affect market price perceptibly.  See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000) 
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CONCLUSION 
Although securities fraud class actions are a well-established legal 
institution, few (if any) such actions in fact satisfy the rigorous 
requirements imposed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
for certification as a class action.  There invariably will be a significant 
number of investors in any plaintiff class who would oppose class 
certification because they would lose more from a successful class action 
than they would gain.  As a result, it is impossible for anyone to be an 
adequate representative of the class.  Moreover, it is likely that in most 
meritorious securities fraud actions, part of the decrease in stock price that 
gives rise to the claim will come from expenses associated with defending 
and settling the securities fraud claim and from harm to the reputation of 
the defendant company resulting in an increase in the cost of capital.  These 
claims are derivative rather than direct.  Accordingly, it is the 
corporation—and not individual buyers—that should recover.  In addition, 
it is much more efficient for such claims to be handled as derivative 
actions.  Thus, a derivative action is superior to a class action.  That too 
precludes certification under Rule 23.  Finally, policy considerations also 
militate against certification.  Diversified investors are protected against 
securities fraud by virtue of being diversified and have no need for a 
remedy that effectively reduces their returns.  Since the vast majority of 
investors are diversified (and since it is irrational for most investors not to 
diversify), their interests should trump those of any undiversified investors 
who would favor a class action remedy.  Moreover, class actions constitute 
excessive deterrence, whereas derivative actions provide a response that is 
proportional to the true harm suffered by investors.  In short, when faced 
with a motion to certify a securities fraud action as a class action, a court 
should ordinarily treat the action as derivative and proceed accordingly.  To 
be clear, this approach would effectively abolish securities fraud class 
actions.  But as demonstrated here, investors in the aggregate would be 
better off as a result. 
 
(explaining that the market price must change significantly in order to meet the causation 
requirement).  But see Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 1318–22 
(2011) (explaining that even though adverse event reports were not statistically significant, 
this did not mean that the reports were not material to a reasonable investor); No. 84 
Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 
920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “the company’s optimistic statements, which failed to 
disclose concerns regarding the safety of a product and unlikelihood of agency of approval 
were material”).  
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APPENDIX 
Class Actions & Settlements by Year  
The following chart is derived from CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW 1 (2011) (for 
data relating to filings and disclosure dollar loss); ELLEN M. RYAN & 
LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS 
ACTION SETTLEMENTS, 2009 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2009) (for data 
relating to settlements 2001 to 2010); and LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. 
RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES 
SETTLEMENTS: 2005 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2006) (for data relating to 
settlements 1996 to 2000).  DDL refers to aggregate price change on the 
date of corrective disclosure. 
 
YEAR FILINGS # FOREIGN # DDL $B SETTLE # SETTLE $M 
1996 111 6 14  
 
1997 174 6 42 14 150 
1998 242 18 80 29 444 
1999 209 10 140 65 1123 
2000 216 12 250 90 4701 
2001 180 14 198 95 2108 
2002 224 21 201 111 3008 
2003 192 16 77 94 2693 
2004 228 27 144 110 3626 
2005 182 25 93 119 10182 
2006 119 13 52 90 18603 
2007 177 29 158 108 7600 
2008 223 30 221 97 2798 
2009 168 20 84 101 3793 
2010 176 28 72 86 3119 
      
TOTALS 2821 275 1826 1209 63948 
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Formulas for Calculating Feedback  
 
BAD NEWS CASE: 
 
PRE-DISCLOSURE MARKET VALUE (10M shares):             $100M = $10.00/share 
POST-DISCLOSURE THEORETICAL VALUE:                          $90M = $9.00/share 
DAMAGES TO BUYERS (60% absolute turnover):                       $6M = $0.60/share 
NET MARKET VALUE POST (tentative) ($90M  6M):                $84M = $8.40/share 
 
But if market value post is $84M, then damages should be 16M x .60 = $9.6M. 
Now market value post is $90M less 9.6M = 81.4M = $8.14/share. 
Process repeats to limit of $15M in total damages payable to buyers. 
 
DAMAGES TO BUYERS:                            $15M / 600K shares = $2.50/share 
BOTTOM LINE FOR BUYERS:                 $7.50/share plus $2.50/share 
BOTTOM LINE FOR HOLDERS:                 $90M  15M = 75M = $7.50/share 
 
GENERAL RULE FOR BAD NEWS CASES: 
 
total decrease in market value = theoretical decrease / (1 – % of shares damaged) 
 
Note that the formula makes it clear that the greater the percentage of 
shares damaged (the greater the turnover of different shares), the greater the 
total decrease in market price (and the greater the aggregate damages or 
settlement value).  Indeed, in a case in which all of the shares have turned 
over, the total decrease in value is theoretically infinite.  To be sure, a 
company cannot decline in value to less than zero.  But securities fraud 
class action damages can wipe out 100% of a company’s market 
capitalization even though some stockholders did not trade.  The following 









BAD NEWS CASE EXAMPLES  
 
Assume hypothetical pre-damages decrease of $10M: 
 
If 20% of shares are damaged, total award is $2.5M or $1.25/share. 
 
If 40% of shares are damaged, total award is $6.67M or $1.67/share. 
 
If 50% of shares are damaged, total award is $10M or $2.00/share. 
 
If 60% of shares are damaged, total award is $15M or $2.50/share. 
 
If 80% of shares are damaged, total award is $40M or $5.00/share. 
 
If 90% of shares are damaged, total award is $100M or $10.00/share.* 
 
 
* Note that $100M is more than entire value of company at $9 per share. 
 
BOOTH_FINALIZEDTHREE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012  11:24 AM 
2012] CLASS CONFLICT IN SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION 769 
 
 
GOOD NEWS CASE: 
 
PRE-DISCLOSURE MARKET VALUE (10M shares):                      $100M = $10.00/share 
POST-DISCLOSURE THEORETICAL VALUE:                  $110M = $11.00/share 
DAMAGES TO SELLERS (60% absolute turnover):                $6M = $0.60/share 
NET MARKET VALUE POST (tentative) (110M – 6M):       $104M = $10.40/share 
 
But if market value post is $104M, then damages should be 4M x .60 = $2.4M. 
Now market value post is $110M less $2.4M = 107.6M = $10.76/share.  
Process repeats to limit of $3.75M in total damages to sellers. 
 
DAMAGES TO SELLERS:                            $3.75M / 600K shares = $0.625/share 
BOTTOM LINE FOR SELLERS:                    $10/share + .625/share = $10.625/share 
BOTTOM LINE FOR HOLDERS:                  $110M  3.75M = 106.25M = $10.625/share 
 
GENERAL RULE FOR GOOD NEWS CASES: 
total increase in market value =  theoretical increase / (1 + % of shares damaged) 
Note that the formula makes it clear that the greater the percentage of 
shares damaged (that is, the greater the turnover of different shares—
absolute turnover), the smaller the total increase in market price (and the 
smaller the aggregate damages or settlement value).  The following chart 
sets forth the results at various levels of absolute turnover. 
 
 
GOOD NEWS CASE EXAMPLES  
 
Assume hypothetical pre-damages increase of $10M: 
 
If 20% of shares are damaged, total award is $1.67M or $.833/share. 
 
If 40% of shares are damaged, total award is $2.86M or $.714/share. 
 
If 50% of shares are damaged, total award is $3.33M or $.667/share. 
 
If 60% of shares are damaged, total award is $3.75M or $.625/share. 
 
If 80% of shares are damaged, total award is $4.44M or $.556/share. 
 
If 100% of shares are damaged, total award is $5.00M or $.500/share.* 
 
 
* Note that $5M is exactly half of the hypothetical increase. 
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EFFECT OF TURNOVER ON MARKET PRICE 
AFTER CORRECTIVE DISCLOSURE 



































































A Further Note on Trading Style 
In practice, portfolio-balancers will almost always oppose securities 
fraud class actions.  But as with all-or-nothing traders, portfolio-balancers 
who are both buyers and holders with regard to a fraud-affected stock may 
sometimes favor a class action depending on the size of the class and the 
number of shares bought versus the number of held.  In general, as the 
plaintiff class gets smaller, the feedback effect is reduced, and the 
additional loss suffered on shares held because of the class action is offset 
by the recovery. For example, a 10% fundamental decrease in price 
becomes a 20% decrease if the plaintiff class comprises 50% of shares.  
But if the plaintiff class comprises just 20% of shares, a 10% decrease in 
price becomes a 12.5% decrease. 
Thus, where the number of damaged shares is relatively small as a 
percentage of shares outstanding, a buyer-holder may come out ahead from 
a class action recovery.  For example, assuming a 50% class and a 20% 
decline in price, an investor who held $750 in shares and bought $1250 in 
additional shares would break even (assuming full recovery less 20% in 
expenses). But assuming a 20% class and a 12.5% decline in price, a buyer-




To be sure, a 20% class seems relatively small in a world in which 
 
 145. Note that the percentage decrease in price does not matter to the calculation.  All 
that matters is the size of the class and the ratio of shares bought to shares held. 
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marketwide turnover is more than 130% and class periods average about 
300 days.  Indeed, at a turnover rate of 130% every share of stock is bought 
and sold once every 280 days.  That would seem to suggest that the 
plaintiff class should usually include 100% of the stockholders.  Obviously 
that cannot be true.  If all of the stockholders recover all of their losses, the 
stock price of the company will be driven to zero in every case by the 
feedback effect.  The answer to this puzzle is that some shares are traded 
much more often than once a year, while other shares are seldom traded at 
all.  For example, if a particular stock has a turnover of 100% per year, it 
could be that every share trades once a year or that half of the shares trade 
twice a year or that 20% of the shares trade five times a year.  In a largely 
anonymous market, there is no way to know.  Accordingly, there is no way 
to know how many shares are represented in a plaintiff class until the 
action is settled and claims are submitted. 
On the other hand, it is rare if not unknown for a plaintiff class to 
recover the full loss suffered.  If a class comprising 50% of outstanding 
shares recovers 50% of its losses, the feedback effect would be as if the 
class comprised 25% of outstanding shares.  
Although it might seem possible that many diversified buyer-holders 
might increase their holdings of a given stock by as much as 33% in any 
given year—from $1500 to $2000 as in the above example—this is really 
quite a large adjustment.  If the additional investment is because of 
rebalancing, it implies that the stock in question has increased in value by 
33% in excess of any increase in the value of the market as a whole.  
Otherwise, it implies that the investor has increased the size of his portfolio 
by 33% in excess of any marketwide increase in value.  While it may not 
be unusual for an individual investor to do so, it would be quite 
extraordinary for a mutual fund or retirement plan to increase in aggregate 
size by 33% because of cash inflows in the space of a year. 
As for the individual investor, it is entirely possible that the size of 
one’s portfolio might grow by 33% in the space of a year, especially if the 
portfolio is small in the first place as it might be with a relatively young 
investor.  But it is quite likely that such an investor will invest through a 
fund of some sort since it is difficult to achieve diversification with a small 
portfolio.  While such an investor might favor a class action, most will have 
most of their claim cut off by virtue of the fact that their fund was a 
relatively small net buyer of the fraud-affected stock.  For example, 
suppose that an investor with $100,000 invested in the Rearguard Equity 
Fund inherits another $100,000 and invests the entire amount in the same 
fund.  Suppose further that Rearguard had recently increased its holdings in 
Enron from 4% to 5%.  Shortly thereafter, Enron stock collapses to zero.  If 
the investor had invested directly in Enron, he would have a claim for a 
$5000 loss.  But his share of the fund’s claim is a mere $1000 for the newly 
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invested cash (plus another $1000 for his existing investment).
146
 
The foregoing thus suggests yet another potential for conflicting 
investor interests.  Up to now we have generally assumed that diversified 
investors buy and sell equal amounts of stock when they trade.  In the 
aggregate, this is true by definition.  But it is entirely possible that some 
diversified investors buy more stock than they sell and thus may lose from 
securities fraud more often than they win.  Such investors may favor 
securities fraud class actions.  On the other hand, for every such net saver 
who adds cash to her account there is another net spender who subtracts 
cash from his account.  Presumably, such an investor will oppose securities 
fraud class actions. 
The foregoing analysis raises a fundamental question for fund 
managers.  How should the fund proceed when it has a claim in a class 
action?  Should the fund always file a claim on the theory that it should 
collect any amounts that it can collect for the benefit of its own 
stockholders?  Or should the fund oppose certification in cases in which it 
stands to lose more on its holdings of the fraud-affected stock than it stands 
to gain in any recovery?  And should it matter that fund investors will have 
differing preferences? The answer to the last question seems easy.  A fund 
cannot realistically consider the individual preferences of fund investors.  
Thus, it would seem that the fund should decide how to proceed based on 
the interests of the fund as a whole.  Even though it might be argued that 
the fund has a fiduciary duty to its investors to serve their interests, there is 
more than one way to do so.  The fact that individual fund investors may 
have conflicting interests seems to dictate that the fund should be managed 
with a view to the whole.  The point is that in a world in which most 
investors invest through funds, the interests of individual investors can 




 146. Moreover, as a practical matter, the litigation may drag on for several years before 
the fund recovers anything.  When it does recover, the award is likely to be added back to 
the fund for the benefit of the investors at the time the award is received.  So new investors 
in the fund get a windfall, while investors who have cashed out and reinvested elsewhere get 
bupkis.  See Richard A. Booth, Who Should Recover What for Late Trading and Market 
Timing?, 1 J. BUS. TECH. L. 101, 101–02 (2006) (discussing the effects of late trading and 
abusive trading practices). 
 147. To be sure, there are times when in the aggregate, mutual fund cash inflows exceed 
outflows (and vice versa).  So there will be times when the interests of funds may tend to be 
more consistent with those of investors who have increased (or decreased) their holdings 
significantly. 
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Effect of Class Size on Recovery 
The following charts show the effects of a class action for various 
combinations of stock held and stock bought assuming a stockholder who 
has a $2000 investment at the time of corrective disclosure and assuming a 
decrease in price (in the absence of a class action) of 10% and assuming 
that litigation expenses equal 20% of the settlement amount (if any). 
 



















2000 0 0 1600 1800 
1500 500 80 1680 1800 
1000 1000 160 1760 1800 
500 1500 240 1840 1800 
0 2000 320 1920 1800 
Note that the stockholder would favor a class action here only if she bought 
$1250 or more of the stock during the fraud period.  In other words, only if 
she increased her holdings by 62.5% or more (which is unlikely for a 
portfolio balancing investor). 
If the plaintiff class comprises 20% of the outstanding shares (rather than 
50%), the feedback effect is smaller. The price of the stock will fall by 
12.5% as a result of feedback (rather than by 20% as in the previous 
example).  The following chart shows the effects of a class action under 
these circumstances. 
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2000 0 0 1750 1800 
1500 500 50 1800 1800 
1000 1000 100 1850 1800 
500 1500 150 1900 1800 
0 2000 200 1950 1800 
 
In this case, an investor will favor prosecution of the class action if he 
bought more than $500 of the stock.  In general, as the plaintiff class gets 
smaller, the feedback effect is reduced, and the conflict between buyer-
holders and other class members is muted. 
 
